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CLOUDY WEATHER, WITH OCCASIONAL SUNSHINE: 
CONSUMER LOANS, THE LEGISLATURE, AND THE 
SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN 
Shigenori Matsui† 
Abstract: The Supreme Court of Japan, despite its well-known passive and 
conservative stance towards constitutional adjudication, occasionally shows quite a 
creative and liberal attitude.  Recently, the Supreme Court of Japan has shown this 
attitude in its development of pro-consumer jurisprudence involving consumer loan cases.  
This development is still more noteworthy because the Supreme Court of Japan ignored 
the legislature’s intent to overturn its previous judgments and practically wiped out a 
statutory provision enacted by the legislature.  As a result of this development, millions 
of consumers could demand refunds from consumer loan companies, and consumer loan 
companies went into serious financial troubles, triggering massive reorganization of the 
industry.  This article outlines this development in the consumer loan cases, examines 
how the Supreme Court of Japan accomplished this result, and explores the reason why 
the Supreme Court of Japan decided to take such a bold action. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Judges in the civil law tradition are supposed to interpret the 
provisions of a statute according to the people’s will as embodied in the 
textual provisions.  They are not making law, but simply following the 
command stipulated in the textual provisions.1  Civil law judges become 
judges right after their professional training and remain on the bench until 
the mandatory retirement age.  They are career judges and are in reality 
judicial bureaucrats working inside the judiciary.2  Japanese judges, trained 
and equipped with judicial power in the longtime civil law tradition that 
dates back to 19th century, generally demonstrate a positivistic and 
bureaucratic attitude. 
 However, everyone knows that judges, even in the civil law tradition, 
often make law.3  Sometimes, they create judicial doctrines that are not 
                                                      
† Professor of Law, University of British Columbia.  
1  For a general description of the role of the judges in the civil law tradition, see MARY ANN 
GLENDON, PAOLO G. CAROZZA, & COLIN B. PICKER, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 248-51 (3d ed. 
2007). 
2  See Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control of Japanese Judges, in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY IN 
THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY 263, 264 (Philip S.C. Lewis ed., 1994) (observing that judges are “virtually 
life-time employees of a national government bureaucracy called the judiciary.”). 
3  See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 53 (1989) 
(“[T]he problem of judicial creativity has emerged even in a growing number of civil law countries in 
contours no less dramatic than in the common law jurisdictions.  Far from not being susceptible to 
comparative analysis, the problem is essentially the same in both legal families.”). 
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anticipated by the legislature.  And, sometimes, they create judicial doctrines 
that are contrary to legislative intent. 
 The Supreme Court of Japan, generally well-known for its passive and 
conservative attitude toward constitutional adjudication,4 occasionally shows 
judicial creativity.  Such judicial creativity is most apparent in its 
establishment of anti-dismissal jurisprudence against employers.  The Labor 
Standard Act mandates that employers provide thirty-day advance notice 
before dismissing employees or pay an average thirty-day salary before 
firing their employees, if such advance notice is not given.5  Thus, one may 
be tempted to believe that private companies could fire their employees if 
they paid a thirty-day average salary.  But, in reality, the Supreme Court of 
Japan fashioned a jurisprudence that practically prohibits private companies 
from firing their employees without compelling reason, invoking the abuse 
of rights doctrine.6  Even when a company is in economic crisis, the courts 
will not allow companies to fire their employees unless the dismissal is 
unavoidable and there is no other alternative to save the company.  As a 
result, it has become quite difficult to dismiss employees in Japan.  The Diet, 
or national legislature, codified this jurisprudence into the Labor Contract 
Act.7  This example clearly shows that judges in Japan can and do create 
judicial doctrine without a basis in statutory provisions.  General clauses of 
the Civil Code, such as a ban on abuse of rights, 8  provide judges a 
convenient tool to create judicial doctrine.  Moreover, this jurisprudence is 
politically quite liberal in the sense that it was meant to protect workers 
against the companies that employ them.  
 Recently, the Supreme Court of Japan showed a similar kind of 
judicial creativity in establishing a pro-consumer jurisprudence against 
consumer loan companies.  This jurisprudence is remarkable because it was 
accomplished by ignoring the legislature’s contrary intent.  Although the 
Diet enacted a statutory provision in order to overturn a previous pro-
consumer judgment, the Supreme Court of Japan ignored this legislative 
intent and practically wiped out the new provision.  The judgments of the 
                                                      
4  SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 145-50 (2011); 
Shigenori Matsui, Why Is the Japanese Supreme Court So Conservative?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1375 
(2011). 
5  Roudō kijunhō [Labor Standard Act], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 20. 
6  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 31, 1977, 268 ROUDŌ HANREI 17 (2nd petty bench) (Kōchi 
Broadcasting Case). See generally Daniel H. Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: 
Activism, in the Service of –Stability?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635 (1996).  
7  Roudō Keiyakuhō [Labor Contract Act], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 16. 
8  MINPŌ [CIV.C.], art. 1, para. 1 (private rights must conform to the public welfare); id. para. 2 (the 
exercise of rights and performance of duties must be done in good faith); id. at para. 3 (no abuse of rights is 
permitted). 
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Supreme Court of Japan had a tremendous impact on the consumer loan 
industry and consumer loan regulation.  As a result of this pro-consumer 
jurisprudence, millions of consumers could now demand refunds from 
consumer loan companies.  Consumer loan companies went into serious 
financial troubles, triggering massive reorganization of the industry.  
Moreover, these developments forced the Diet to amend the regulatory 
statute in order to introduce more demanding regulation against consumer 
loan companies.  This pro-consumer jurisprudence is also highly liberal in 
that these judgments were meant to protect consumers against consumer 
loan companies.  
This article shows how the Supreme Court of Japan accomplished this 
result by engaging in creative judicial law-making.  Part II provides a 
background for the development of the pro-consumer jurisprudence by the 
Supreme Court of Japan.  It outlines the statutory framework for limiting 
interest rates on consumer loans, the historical development of the consumer 
loan industry, and the response of the Supreme Court of Japan to the 
limitations on interest rates.  We will see that despite a legislative 
compromise, which allowed consumer loan companies to collect higher 
interest rates while limiting the maximum interest rate, the Supreme Court of 
Japan came to ignore this compromise and wiped out the statutory provision 
in order to benefit consumers.  Then, this article will examine the legislative 
response to the judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan and see how the 
legislature introduced new regulatory framework to control consumer loan 
companies.  By introducing this comprehensive regulation, the legislature 
overturned the judgment of the Supreme Court of Japan and allowed the 
collection of higher interest by the consumer loan companies.  The Supreme 
Court of Japan initially showed its willingness to accept this legislative 
judgment.  But soon the Supreme Court of Japan came to ignore it and made 
this provision a dead letter.  
Part III will examine how the Supreme Court of Japan could 
practically wipe out this new statutory provision, paying close attention to 
what kind of interpretive techniques were used by the Supreme Court of 
Japan to reach this result.  Then Part IV examines the impact of those 
judgments and the 2006 amendments brought by the Diet in response to 
them.  Specifically, it inquires whether these judgments were a blessing for 
consumers and whether they managed to solve the root problem of money 
borrowing in Japan.  Finally, Part V summaries the interpretive methodology 
used by the Supreme Court of Japan to illustrate how creative the court was 
and explores why it decided to take such a bold action.  Although the there is 
wide support for the development of this pro-consumer jurisprudence, 
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despite the contrary legislative intent, how such a development could be 
justified in a democratic country remains a question. 
II. CONSUMER LOANS AND CONSUMERS  
 In order to understand the context for the development of the pro-
consumer jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Japan, we need to examine 
the background of consumer loan regulation in Japan.  Formerly, although 
the maximum interest rate that consumer loan companies could charge was 
restricted by statute, consumer loan companies were allowed to collect 
higher interest rates–only the highest rates were criminally prohibited.  The 
consumer loan industry grew into a major industry, taking advantage of this 
regulatory gap.  The Supreme Court of Japan initially showed its willingness 
to accept this legislative compromise.  However, it came to ignore this 
compromise and wipe out the statutory provision for the benefit of 
consumers.  In response to this judicial development, the legislature 
introduced a new regulatory framework to control consumer loan companies.  
The legislature once again decided to allow consumer loan companies to 
receive a higher interest rate.  The legislature apparently intended to 
overturn the judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan.  The Supreme Court 
of Japan then showed its willingness to accept this legislative judgment. 
 
A. “Gray Zone” Interest Rate 
 
Like many Americans, Japanese people borrow money from banks, 
credit unions, and other financial institutions.  Especially when they buy 
houses, they have to rely upon financial institutions for a loan.  The loan is 
granted only after very careful review of the borrower’s financial situation.  
These financial institutions generally require mortgages on property as 
collateral, and require borrowers to sign assurance contracts with the 
assurance companies and to sign life insurance contracts to secure payment.  
The amount of money that consumers can borrow depends upon the 
financial capacity of the borrower and the value of their property as 
collateral.  
The maximum interest rate that financial institutions can charge is 
stipulated in the Interest Rate Limitation Act of 1954.9  This act sets the 
maximum interest rate for a loan according to the amount of principal in 
Article 1, paragraph 1.10  If the principal amounts to less than 100,000 yen 
                                                      
9  Risokuseigenhō [Interest Rate Limitation Act], Law No. 100 of 1954, art. 1. 
10  Id. art. 1, para. 1. 
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(1,000 USD with the exchange rate of 1 USD to 100 yen), the maximum 
interest rate is 20% per year.  If principal amounts to more than 100,000 yen 
and less than one million yen (10,000 USD), the maximum interest rate is 
18% per year. If the principal amounts to more than one million yen, the 
maximum interest rate is 15% per year.  Any contract with an interest rate 
higher than the rate stipulated in this act is null and void.11   Financial 
institutions must obey this limitation.  However, this is a civil law statute 
and carries no criminal punishment against violation. 
On the other hand, many people need financial assistance for 
everyday life or for business.  For these people, loans from financial 
institutions are unavailable or unattractive.  Most of them do not have any 
property to mortgage.  Moreover, they need money more quickly.  They 
cannot endure the financial institutions’ long and complicated review of 
their financial situations.  Furthermore, banks are not enthusiastic about 
consumer retail loans.  Thus, the average individual must turn to consumer 
loan companies that are willing to provide loans without an elaborate review 
process and without the requirement to submit properties for mortgage.  
Many of these consumer loan companies were called “sala-kin” (finance for 
salaried workers) because most of their customers were salaried workers.  
All a customer had to do was provide a piece of identification, and the 
consumer loan company would be happy to lend money with minimal 
review (generally they would check whether the applicants were actually 
working at the company as they claimed).  The amount of money they could 
receive was usually small, often less than 500,000 yen (5,000 USD) or one 
million yen.  Customers were usually allowed to pay back the loan by 
monthly installment.  
Because of the minimal review process, many consumers ended up 
failing to pay back their borrowed money.  Moreover, the loans were largely 
unsecured loans.  To make a profit, these consumer loan companies charged 
much higher interest rates, often higher than the rate stipulated in the Interest 
Rate Limitation Act.  Even though a contract is null and void to the extent it 
charges higher interest rate, there is a provision in the Interest Rate 
Limitation Act that prevents consumers from requesting a refund if they paid 
the higher interest “voluntarily.”12  The consumer loan companies were thus 
allowed to charge a higher interest rate and collect payment. 
 The only limitation was the maximum interest rate stipulated in the 
Capital Subscription Act.  This act established the maximum interest rate, 
                                                      
11  Id. 
12  Id. art. 1, para. 2.  This provision was later deleted in 2006.  See infra note 135. 
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with a criminal punishment against violation.13  The maximum interest rate 
allowed was 109.5% in 1954, and it was cut down to 73% in 1983, 54.75% 
in 1986, 40% in 1991, and then 29.2% from 2000.14  If consumer loan 
companies charged an interest rate higher than this maximum interest rate, 
then the police could search their offices, arrest the managers, and prosecute 
them for a criminal law violation.  As a result, on the surface of the statutes, 
consumer loan companies could charge an interest rate higher than the rate 
stipulated in the Interest Rate Limitation Act so long as the interest rate was 
lower than the maximum interest rate stipulated in the Capital Subscription 
Act.  The legislature apparently made a compromise between business and 
consumer interests.  The gap in interest rate regulation between the two acts 
is generally called the “gray-zone” interest rate.15 
 
B. Consumer Loans and Japanese Borrowers 
 
The modern consumer loan industry in Japan was a rather dubious one 
in the beginning.16  It started in the 1950s, and most of the loan companies 
were small companies, operating in small offices in city-center, high-rise 
buildings.  Unlike financial institutions, which were subject to tight 
regulation by the Ministry of Finance and now by the Financial Services 
Agency, these consumer loan companies were once only subject to 
notification requirements and to regulation under the Act Concerning the 
Policing of the Loan Company of 1949.17  But in 1954, as part of an attempt 
at liberalization, this statute was abolished and consumer loan companies 
were left to be generally regulated by the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (“MITI”) (the predecessor of the current Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry).  As a result, the industry was not well regulated and 
many people suspected that these loan companies had some ties with illegal 
gang groups and were engaging in some suspicious activities.  As we will 
see, in 1983, the Consumer Loan Company Act 18  was enacted and the 
                                                      
13  Shusshi no ukeire, azukarikin oyobi kinritō no torishimari ni kansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning 
Regulation of Receipt of Subscription of Capital, Deposit, and Interest Rate], Law No. 195 of 1954, art. 5. 
14  This provision was later amended in 2006 and the maximum interest rate was cut down to 20% per 
year. See infra note 136. For a history of change in the maximum interest rate regulation after the WWII, 
see Andrew M. Pardieck, Japan and the Moneylender–Activist Courts and Substantive Justice, 17 PACIFIC 
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 529, 540-42 (2008). 
15  Id. at 543. 
16  For a history of moneylenders and the usury regulation before WWII, see Pardieck, supra note 14, 
at 533-40. 
17  Kashikingyōtō no torishimarini kansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning Policing of the Loan Company], 
Law No. 170 of 1949 (abolished in 1954). 
18  Kashikingyōhō [Loan Company Act], Law No. 32 of 1983.  Its original title was Kashikingyōno 
kiseitō nikansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning Regulation of Loan Company] but its title was amended to the 
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government introduced much stricter regulation by the Ministry of Finance 
(later regulated by the Financial Services Agency), but there still remained a 
striking difference between the regulation of consumer loan companies and 
the regulation of financial institutions.  
Gradually, large corporations came to dominate the market and 
foreign financial institutions also entered the market.  These large 
corporations adopted a media strategy to improve the industry’s image.  
They hired many female customer service representatives, ran many 
television commercials, and attempted to create an image that the consumer 
loan companies are well-regulated, customer-friendly companies.  Their 
strategy paid off and consumers gradually came to accept the consumer loan 
companies.  Especially after the burst of the economic bubble in the early 
1990s, an increasing number of consumers turned to consumer loan 
companies.  Many consumers simply had to borrow money to survive 
because of the long-lasting economic stagflation.19  
In the 2000s, the consumer loan industry became a booming business.  
Takefuji, Promise, Aiful, Acom, Lake, and others companies ran television 
commercials soliciting customers and competing to provide consumer 
friendly service.  They advertised how easy it was to borrow money and 
assured customers that their privacy would be carefully protected.  They 
opened offices in the most popular spots in the city and their offices were 
nicely decorated.  They made it possible for customers to borrow money 
through ATM machines with minimum review.  They even built shields to 
protect the privacy of customers entering the ATM office to ease consumer 
fears that they might be noticed by neighbors.  Consumer loans became quite 
popular.  It was estimated that fourteen million customers, one in nine of the 
total population, were borrowing money from these consumer loan 
companies.20  It is no wonder that the consumer loan industry registered a 
huge profit. 
Because the review process for borrowers was minimal, many 
consumers used to borrow money from multiple consumer loan companies, 
leading to huge amounts of debt with no prospect of paying the loans back.  
Some consumers had to borrow money in order to pay the higher interest of 
                                                                                                                                                              
current one from 2007.  For a closer examination of the regulation introduced, see infra notes 36-42; 
Pardieck, supra note 14, at 552-54. 
19  Pardieck, supra note 14, at 558; MARK D. WEST, LAW IN EVERYDAY JAPAN: SEX, SUMO, 
SUICIDE, AND STATUTES 225 (2005) (noting the significant increase of the consumer debt in the 1990s). 
20  FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, TAJŪSAIMUSHATAISAKUHONBU YŪSHIKISHAKAIGI [CONFERENCE 
OF EXPERTS OF THE HEADQUARTER FOR COPING WITH HEAVILY-INDEBTED BORROWERS], 
TAJŪSAIMUSHAMONDAINO KAIKETSU NIMUKETA HOUSAKU NITSUITE [ON MEASURES TO COPE WITH THE 
ISSUES CONCERNING HEAVILY-INDEBTED BORROWERS] (Apr. 9, 2007). 
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the existing loans, increasing the total amount of their loan.  The number of 
such deeply indebted consumers surpassed two million by 2006.21  Some 
companies began to use violent or threatening collection methods, forcing 
debtors to run away or commit suicide.  The use of such violent and 
intimidating collection methods became widely known in 1999, when one 
employee of the loan company Nichiei demanded that the defaulting 
borrower sell his kidney or eyeball to pay off the loan.22  Regulation of the 
loan companies was tightened.23  Nevertheless, consumer loan companies 
were willing to lend money even with additional risks of default in order to 
increase the number of loans.  As a result, the consumer loan issue became a 
very serious social issue.24 
 
C. The Response of the Supreme Court of Japan 
 
The Supreme Court of Japan initially showed its willingness to accept 
the compromise reached in the Interest Rate Limitation Act.  In a 1955 
ruling, the Supreme Court of Japan rejected the claim for a refund when the 
customer paid an interest rate higher than the rate prescribed by the Interest 
Rate Limitation Act without objecting.25  In another case, a customer argued 
that a loan contract with an interest rate higher than the maximum prescribed 
in the Interest Rate Limitation Act was against “public order and good moral” 
as stipulated in Article 90 of the Civil Code,26 and that the contract should be 
viewed as null and void as a whole.  But the Supreme Court of Japan was 
not persuaded.  It held that, in the absence of special circumstances, a 
contract with a higher interest rate could not be said to violate pubic order or 
                                                      
21  In 2006, it was reported that some 2.3 million borrowers were heavily in debt, in debt to five or 
more lenders, and 2.7 million were behind on payments and were in default.  Id.; Pardieck, supra note 14, 
at 530. 
22  Pardieck, supra note 14, at 560-61. 
23  In response, the maximum interest rate in the Capital Subscription Act was reduced from 40% to 
29.2%.  See supra note 14.  The system of sharing credit information was also established by major loan 
companies, allowing the consumer loan companies to find out how much money the borrower was 
borrowing from other loan companies in total.  CREDIT INFORMATION CENTER, available at 
http://www.cic.co.jp/.  But it was only major loan companies that used this credit information and the use 
was not mandatory. 
24  Souichirou Kozuka & Luke R. Nottage, Re-Regulating Unsecured Consumer Credit in Japan: 
Over-Indebted Borrowers, the Supreme Court, and New Legislation, (Sydney Law School Research Paper 
No. 07/62, Sept. 2007) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019392. 
25  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 22, 1955, 9 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
209 (3rd petty bench). 
26  MINPŌ [CIV. C.], art. 90. 
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good moral in and of itself.27  This stance was affirmed again in 1962.  The 
Supreme Court denied a borrower’s claim for a refund when the borrower 
voluntarily paid back a higher interest rate under Article 1, paragraph 2 of 
the Interest Rate Limitation Act, and also denied the application of the 
excessive payment to the satisfaction of the principal, holding that such 
application would undermine Article 1, paragraph 2.28 
 However, gradually, the Supreme Court of Japan came to protect 
borrowers against consumer loan companies.  The Supreme Court of Japan 
held in 1964 that, although consumers could not request a refund when they 
paid the higher interest rate voluntarily, their payments had to be viewed as 
satisfying the principal, thus reducing the amount of principal.29  Even when 
a customer paid money designated as a payment of interest, the Supreme 
Court of Japan said, an excessive interest rate beyond the rate stipulated in 
Article 1 of the Interest Rate Limitation Act was void and such a designation 
was meaningless and should be treated as if there were no designation at 
all.30  This judgment was hailed as “the beginning of a newly assertive 
Supreme Court” for the protection of consumers. 31   In 1968, when a 
consumer made a payment after he had already paid back the principal, 
believing that he still owed the money, the Supreme Court of Japan held that 
a consumer could request a refund as a remedy for unjust enrichment.32  
Article 1, paragraph 2 is a provision, according to the Supreme Court of 
Japan, that assumes the remaining balance to be paid, and therefore this 
provision does not preclude a refund claim when the consumers paid off all 
the principal.33  In other words, when the debtor pays an interest rate in 
excess of the statutory limit and when the debtor’s payments satisfy the 
principal, then the debtor can demand a refund for amounts paid beyond the 
principal despite Article 1, paragraph 2.  These judgments practically made 
Article 1, paragraph 2 a dead letter.  These were clear examples of “judicial 
legislation.”34 
                                                      
27  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 18, 1953, 7 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1470 (2nd petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 5, 1954, 8 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 2014 (2nd petty bench). 
28  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 13, 1962, 16 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1340 (grand bench). 
29  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 18, 1964, 18 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1868 (grand bench).  The Supreme Court of Japan thus overruled its 1962 judgment.  Id.  
30  Id. 
31  Pardieck, supra note 14, at 545. 
32  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 13, 1968, 22 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
2526 (grand bench).  See MINPŌ [CIV. C.] art. 703. 
33  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 13, 1968, 22 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
2526 (grand bench). 
34  Pardieck, supra note 14, at 547. 
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In these judgments, the Supreme Court of Japan gave priority to the 
overarching legislative intent of consumer protection manifested in the 
Interest Rate Limitation Act.  Interpreting the payment of interest in excess 
of the statutory limitation as satisfying the principal and thus reducing the 
amount of principal to be paid, said the Supreme Court of Japan, comports 
with the “primary legislative intent of the law to protect the borrower who 
was in economically disadvantaged position.” 35   The Supreme Court of 
Japan thereby ignored the compromise that the legislature made.  The 
legislature, while limiting the interest rate in the Interest Rate Limitation Act, 
left the higher interest rate un-prohibited in the Capital Subscription Act 
(subject to limitations stipulated in that Capital Subscription Act) and 
allowed lenders to receive the payment of higher interest rates so long as the 
payment was voluntary under Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Interest Rate 
Limitation Act.  These judgments, however, practically deprived Article 1, 
paragraph 2 of the Interest Rate Limitation Act of any meaning.  
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Japan did not care about the parties’ 
contractual intent.  Usually, consumers pay back loans through monthly 
installments and the amount of payment is clearly divided into payment 
towards the principal and payment towards the interest.  Consumers thus 
know that they are paying towards a higher interest rate.  Nevertheless, even 
when the debtor payment is designated as a payment of interest, that intent is 
disregarded by the Supreme Court of Japan.  The payment of interest in 
excess of the statutory limit is now automatically viewed as satisfying the 
principal and any overpayment must be refunded when the payment has 
already satisfied the principal. 
 
D. Loan Company Act and Article 43 
 
In 1983, however, the Loan Company Act36 was enacted to regulate 
consumer loan companies.  This Act was meant to secure the proper 
operation of consumer loan businesses, thereby protecting the interests of the 
borrower and contributing to the proper administration of national life.37  
This act introduced a registration requirement for consumer loan companies 
with the prime minister or prefectural governor38 and imposed an elaborate 
                                                      
35  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 18, 1964, 18 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1868 (grand bench). 
36  Kashikingyōhō [Loan Company Act], Law No. 32 of 1983. 
37  Id. art. 1. 
38  Id. art. 3.  Loan companies to be registered under this act include consumer loan companies 
(Shōhisha kin-yū or shōhisha loan) as well as business loan companies (Shōkō loan) and credit companies 
that lend money by using credit cards (if the customer buys some goods using credit card, this is shopping 
JUNE 2013  CONSUMER LOANS IN JAPAN 565 
 
governmental regulatory scheme.  For example, under Article 17 of this act, 
a loan company was obliged to provide the customer with a written 
document stating the details of the contract–the name and address of the loan 
company, the date of the contract, the amount of the loan, the interest rate, 
the method of payment, the term and frequency of the payment, the penalty 
for default, and other information to be specified by the cabinet order–at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract.39  Under Article 18, the loan company 
was obliged to provide written receipt stating the transaction, including:  the 
name and address of the loan company, the date of the contract, the amount 
of the loan, the amount of receipt, how the received payment is apportioned 
to the principal and interest, the date of receipt, and other information to be 
specified by the cabinet order.40  The payment collection method was also 
regulated.  Harassment or invasion of privacy was prohibited in the 
collection of a loan.41  All of these regulations were enforced by the Ministry 
of Finance (now enforced by the Financial Services Agency). 
In exchange for government regulation, Article 43 of this act deemed 
the payment of an interest rate higher than the rate stipulated in the Interest 
Rate Limitation Act as valid payment of interest under certain 
circumstances:  the consumers must have paid the money voluntarily, the 
consumer loan company must have provided the written document showing 
the necessary information at the time of conclusion of consumer loan 
contract as stipulated in Article 17, and the consumer loan company must 
have provided a written receipt stipulated in Article 18 immediately when it 
receives a payment from the consumer.42  The registered consumer loan 
companies were thus expressly granted the right to receive the higher 
interest rate under this provision subject to limitation of the Capital 
Subscription Act.  Apparently, the legislative intent behind this provision 
was to overrule the pro-consumer judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan. 
Article 43 was not popular among lawyers.  Many criticized it for 
allowing consumer loan companies to take advantage of the desperate 
economic situation of borrowers and charge higher interest rates–rates made 
illegal under the Interest Rate Limitation Act.  In the 1980s and early 1990s, 
however, the Supreme Court of Japan seemed to accept the legislative 
judgment.  It allowed loan companies to receive payments of excessive 
                                                                                                                                                              
credit and is not subjected to the Loan Company Act). Banks, credit unions and similar financial 
institutions are not subjected to this Act. 
39  Id. art. 17. 
40  Id. art. 18. 
41  Id. art. 21. 
42  Id. art. 43.  This provision was deleted and replaced with another provision in 2006.  See infra 
note 134. 
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interest rates, even when the consumer did not know that he or she was 
paying an excessively high interest rate.43  It was not legally required that a 
debtor understand that he or she was paying an interest rate in excess of the 
statutory limit; the contract was not void to the extent that the higher interest 
rate was charged in order for the debtor to pay back it back “voluntarily.”44  
If the debtor made a payment with the understanding that it would be applied 
to interest, the Supreme Court of Japan held, that was sufficient to make the 
payment “voluntary,” and to enable the consumer loan company to enjoy the 
benefit of Article 43.45  
III. CONSUMER LOANS, THE LEGISLATURE, AND THE SUPREME COURT OF 
JAPAN 
We saw that there used to exist a gap between the maximum interest 
rate allowed by the Interest Rate Limitation Act and the maximum interest 
rate prohibited by the Capital Subscription Act with criminal punishment.  
The consumer loan companies were permitted under Article 1, paragraph 2 
of the Interest Rate Limitation Act to collect interest rates higher than the 
maximum interest rates allowed by the Interest Rate Limitation Act so long 
as the interest rate was lower than the maximum interest rate prohibited by 
the Capital Subscription Act.  We also saw that the Supreme Court of Japan, 
initially showing willingness to accept this compromise, came to practically 
wipe out Article 1, paragraph 2 and deny consumer loan companies the 
ability to collect higher interest rates.  However, the legislature responded to 
this development by introducing comprehensive regulation of consumer loan 
companies in the Loan Company Act and inserting the statutory provision, 
Article 43, to overturn the judgment of the Supreme Court of Japan–
consumer loan companies were again allowed to collect higher interest rates.  
We also saw that at first the Supreme Court of Japan was willing to show 
deference to the new enactment. 
Nevertheless, it did not take long for the Supreme Court of Japan to 
reverse this attitude.  Once again, the Supreme Court of Japan came to adopt 
a highly pro-consumer stance.  As we will examine more closely in this Part, 
the Supreme Court of Japan came to:  
1. construe conditions for enjoying the benefit of Article 43 quite 
strictly;  
                                                      
43  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 22, 1990, 44 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
332 (2nd petty bench). 
44  Id. 
45  Id. 
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2. view all additional payment other than payment to the principal as 
payment of interest;  
3. deny the applicability of Article 43 when the loan company 
subtracted the higher interest at the time of loan;  
4. construe the voluntariness requirement rigidly;  
5. view payment of excessive interest as satisfying other loans;  
6. allow customers to demand refunds from the loan companies when 
they paid back the principal;  
7. impose the obligation to pay refunds with statutory interest rate;  
8. extend the period before the statute of limitations precludes a 
refund claim; and  
9. impose on the loan companies the duty to disclose the transaction 
history to customers.  
The Supreme Court of Japan thus practically denied consumer loan 
companies the benefit of receiving payment of higher interest rates admitted 
under Article 43 and allowed millions of customers to demand refunds from 
consumer loan companies after they paid off all their loans.  In other words, 
it essentially wiped out Article 43. 
 
A. Construing the Requirements for Enjoying Article 43 Strictly 
 
First, the Supreme Court of Japan interpreted the conditions attached 
to receiving payment from consumers literally and made it quite difficult for 
consumer loan companies to enjoy the benefits of Article 43.  In 1999, the 
Supreme Court of Japan held that the written receipt requirement in Article 
18 must be rigidly enforced.  In that case, the customer wired funds for 
scheduled payments directly to the bank account of the loan company and 
later claimed that the payment of a higher interest rate should be construed 
to satisfy the principal despite Article 43.  The consumer loan company 
argued that when the customer wired funds directly into their bank account, 
the requirement of written receipt should not apply and that the loan 
company should be allowed to enjoy the benefits of Article 43.  The 
Supreme Court of Japan was not persuaded by the arguments of the 
consumer loan company.46  Emphasizing that the written receipt must be 
issued immediately upon receiving each payment as stipulated in Article 18, 
the Supreme Court of Japan held that even when the customers wired their 
payment directly into the bank account of the consumer loan company, the 
                                                      
46  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 21, 1999, 53 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 98 
(1st petty bench). 
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consumer loan company had to follow all of the requirements strictly in 
order to enjoy the benefit of Article 43.47 
 In another case, the Supreme Court of Japan held that the receipt must 
be provided “immediately,” as provided in Article 18.48  Although the loan 
company in this case provided the written receipt after it received payment 
by wire transfer, this was sometimes more than twenty days after the receipt 
of payment.  In a 2004 judgment, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
receipt was not provided immediately and denied the loan company the 
benefit of Article 43.49 
 In another 2004 judgment, the Supreme Court of Japan held that, in 
order to enjoy the benefit of Article 43, all of the items designated in Article 
17 must be included in the loan documents. 50   In this case, all the 
information was included except for a description of collateral.  If there was 
a missing item, the Supreme Court of Japan held, Article 17 was not 
satisfied.51  The Supreme Court of Japan thus concluded that the consumer 
loan company could not enjoy the benefit of Article 43.52 
 Furthermore, when the loan company preprinted all required 
disclosures in Article 18 at the time the loan was made, and provided the 
customer a series of bank transfer forms, together with each disclosure as 
required by Article 43, the Supreme Court of Japan did not allow the loan 
company to enjoy the benefit of Article 43. 53   Because the required 
information must be provided in written receipt immediately after the receipt 
of each payment, the Supreme Court of Japan held, anticipatory disclosures 
provided before the payment did not satisfy the requirement of Article 43.54  
The Supreme Court of Japan extended this philosophy of rigid 
interpretation to cases involving revolving loan contracts–a practice that was 
                                                      
47  Id.  The Consumer Loan Act, Article 18, paragraph 2, required the loan company to provide 
written receipt only upon the request of the customer when the customer wired payment to the bank 
account of the loan company.  However, the Supreme Court of Japan construed Article 43 as overriding 
Article 18, paragraph 2, to require written receipt even when the customer did not ask for it.  The consumer 
loan company was thus forced to provide the written receipt each time it received payment from the 
customer.  Id.  
48  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 20, 2004, 58 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
475 (2nd petty bench). 
49  See also Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 9, 2004, 214 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI 
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 709 (2nd petty bench) (holding that written receipt delivered seven or ten days after 
the payment was not immediately issued). 
50  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 20, 2004, 58 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
475 (2nd petty bench). 
51  Id. 
52  Id. 
53  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 20, 2004, 58 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
380 (2nd petty bench). 
54  Id. 
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not anticipated at the time the Loan Company Act was enacted.  When a 
borrower made a revolving loan contract, the borrower could borrow money 
up to the limit stipulated in the contract, and the borrower had a choice as to 
the payment amount, term, and frequency.  Therefore, it was impossible to 
stipulate the amount of payment or the term and frequency of the payment in 
advance in the loan contract.  The Supreme Court of Japan affirmed the 
necessity of strictly construing the Article 17 requirement.55  Although the 
term and frequency of payment or the amount of payment could not be fixed 
at the time of the contract, the loan companies were obliged to provide the 
equivalent information, i.e., the minimum amount of payment and the term 
and frequency of payment if the consumer decides to pay that minimum 
amount in the loan document as stipulated in Article 17.56  The absence of 
such equivalent information prevented loan companies from enjoying the 
benefit of Article 43. 
 Furthermore, in its 2006 judgment, the Supreme Court of Japan did 
not allow even a minor exception to the disclosure requirement in the written 
receipt.57  In this case, the customer borrowed three million yen (30,000 
USD), repayable over five years at a 29% interest rate, and when the 
consumer fell behind in payment the loan company sued him to collect an 
outstanding balance of some 1.9 million yen (19,000 USD).  The customer 
argued that payment of an interest rate higher than the interest rate stipulated 
in the Interest Rate Limitation Act should be viewed as satisfying the 
principal.  The loan company countered that it could enjoy the benefit of 
Article 43. 
The loan company in this case provided necessary documents at the 
time of the contract and also provided a written receipt every time it received 
payment disclosing almost all information required.  However, the company 
indicated the customer’s contract number and not the contract date.  Since 
the contract number could be matched with the contract date, this might 
seem to be a harmless error.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Japan held 
that the loan company must strictly obey the exact requirements of Article 
18 to enjoy the benefit of Article 43.58  This mistake was fatal for the loan 
company, which could no longer enjoy the benefits of Article 43. 
 Indeed, this was not an error of the loan company.  The loan company 
simply relied upon the Cabinet Order, which permitted the loan company to 
                                                      
55  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 15, 2005, 59 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
2899 (1st petty bench). 
56  Id. 
57  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 13, 2006, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1 
(2nd petty bench). 
58  Id. 
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substitute the contract number for the contract date.  In other words, the loan 
company was merely following the government’s instruction.  The Supreme 
Court of Japan held, however, that the Loan Company Act simply delegated 
the power to add, by the cabinet order, additional information to be 
described in the receipt and was not meant to allow the substitution of listed 
items with others. 59   Since the loan company must obey the exact 
requirements of Article 18 to invoke Article 43, the Supreme Court of Japan 
concluded that this order exceeded the bounds of legal discretion conferred 
by the statute and is thus illegal.60  As a result, it held that the Cabinet Order 
was invalid and that loan company could not rely upon this order to enjoy 
the benefit of Article 43.61  
 In 2006, the Supreme Court of Japan also held that if there was 
incorrect information or ambiguity in the loan contract then the loan 
company could not satisfy the requirement of Article 17, thus precluding the 
loan company from enjoying the benefit of Article 43.62  According to the 
Supreme Court of Japan, all the designated items specified in Article 17 had 
to be disclosed and that when they were not disclosed in an accurate and 
clear manner the requirements of Article 17 were not satisfied.63  The loan 
contract’s language in this case was incorrect with respect to the amount of 
the loan and was unclear to the extent that the contract described days when 
the lender would not make collection calls as “customary holidays when 
transactions are not made.”  The Supreme Court of Japan held that these 
errors and ambiguity left the requirements of Article 17 unsatisfied and thus 
prevented the loan company from enjoying the benefit of Article 43.64  
 
B. All Additional Payment Must Be Viewed as Payment of Interest 
Second, the Supreme Court of Japan held that all the money the 
customer paid, other than for the payment for the principal, should be 
viewed as payment towards interest.65  
                                                      
59  Id. 
60  Id.  
61  Id.  See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 17, 2006, 219 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI 
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 927 (2nd petty bench). 
62  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 24, 2006, 219 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ 
MINJI] 243 (3rd petty bench). 
63  Id. 
64  Id. See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 24, 2006, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 319 (3rd petty bench) (collection day and payment day were unclear); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. 
Ct.] July 13, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1980 (2nd petty bench) (amount 
of the payment to be made was incorrect). 
65  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 18, 2003, 57 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
895 (2nd petty bench). 
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After the amendment to the Capital Subscription Act that reduced the 
maximum interest rate from 40% to 29.2%, many consumer loan companies 
came to substitute the higher interest rate with other charges, such as 
collection or guarantee fees, and claimed that the interest rate did not exceed 
the maximum rate.  In one case, a consumer claimed a refund after paying 
because the interest plus the fees exceeded the limit prescribed in the Interest 
Rate Limitation Act.  The Supreme Court of Japan upheld the argument of 
the customer and concluded that any payment other than payment to be 
applied to satisfy the principal should be viewed as payment of interest, 
regardless of whether these payments were charged as fees or other 
charges. 66   As a result, consumer loan companies are precluded from 
charging other fees to avoid the limitation on interest rate.67 
 
C. Denying the Applicability of Article 43 When Loan Companies 
Subtracted the Higher Interest at the Time of the Loan 
Some loan companies subtract the higher interest rate at the time of 
taking out the loan.  In Article 2, the Interest Rate Limitation Act stipulated 
that, when the interest was subtracted at the time of taking out the loan, all 
the money beyond the amount recalculated according to Article 1, based on 
the amount the borrower actually received as a principal, should be deemed 
to be applied to the principal.68  The question was raised whether a consumer 
loan company that subtracted a higher amount of interest at the time of 
taking out the loan could still invoke Article 43 to receive a payment of a 
higher interest rate.  In a 2004 judgment, the Supreme Court of Japan denied 
the applicability of Article 43 when the loan company subtracted the interest 
at the time of taking out the loan.69  Article 43 of the Loan Company Act is, 
according to the Supreme Court of Japan, a special provision to Article 1, 
paragraph 1 of the Interest Rate Limitation Act. 70   It is not a special 
provision to Article 2 of the Interest Rate Limitation Act.  Therefore, Article 
43 of the Loan Company Act is not applicable when Article 2 of the Interest 
Rate Limitation Act is applied.71  
                                                      
66  See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 11, 2003, 210 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI 
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 617 (1st petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 16, 2003, 210 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 729 (3rd petty bench). 
67  See also Kashikingyōhō [Loan Company Act], Law No. 32 of 1983, art. 12-8, para. 2. 
68  Risokuseigenhō [Interest Rate Limitation Act], Law No. 100 of 1954, art. 2. 
69  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 20, 2004, 58 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
475 (2nd petty bench). 
70  Id. 
71  Id. 
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D. Construing the Requirement of Voluntariness Rigidly 
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Japan came to construe the word 
“voluntarily” strictly to deny the application of Article 43.  The warning sign 
was given by the concurring opinion of Justice Shigeo Takii in a 2004 
judgment.72  This case involved a loan contract with a clause that mandated 
the borrower pay back all of the remaining loan when he or she defaulted on 
one payment and a clause that mandated a much higher interest rate (40%, 
higher than the permissible maximum rate) when he or she defaulted.  
Because a consumer could not borrow money unless he or she agreed to this 
acceleration clause, Justice Takii argued, any payment made under this 
acceleration clause should not be viewed as being made “voluntarily.”  
  Justice Takii’s opinion did not attract support of the majority in 2004, 
but the majority adopted Justice Takii’s stance in their January 13, 2006 
judgment. 73   In this case, an acceleration clause in the loan contract 
stipulated that, in the event of default, all of the remaining balance and 
interest was due immediately, with the penalty of a higher, 29.2% interest 
rate.  According to the Supreme Court of Japan, Article 43 is an exception 
and must be interpreted strictly in light of the legislative intent to protect the 
interests of borrowers.74  In order to decide whether the borrower had paid 
the interest “voluntarily,” the Supreme Court of Japan held that courts must 
examine whether there was coercion in fact. 75   When there was an 
acceleration clause, the Supreme Court of Japan reasoned, the borrower had 
to pay the excessive interest in order to avoid the penalty, and therefore any 
payment under this acceleration clause could not be said to be a payment of 
the borrower’s own free will in the absence of special circumstances.76 
 Since this acceleration clause was included in almost all consumer 
loan contracts, this judgment practically excluded all benefit of Article 43 
from all consumer loan companies.77  This holding was a landmark in the 
history of pro-consumer jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Japan.  
                                                      
72  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 20, 2004, 58 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
475 (2nd petty bench) (Takii, J. concurring). 
73  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 13, 2006, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1 
(2nd petty bench). 
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
76  Id.  
77  The day this judgment was handed down was indeed a “doomsday” for the consumer finance 
business in Japan.  See James Johnson, An Activist Supreme Court Does Not a Market Make: The Effect of 
Japanese Supreme Court Rulings on the Consumer Finance Industry, 6 DARTMOUTH L.J. 16, 27 (2008).  
The Supreme Court of Japan affirmed this rigid attitude in the later judgments as well.  See Saikō 
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 19, 2006, 219 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 31 (1st 
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 The Supreme Court of Japan confirmed this demanding attitude 
toward voluntariness in its other 2006 judgment.  In this case, the Supreme 
Court of Japan required clear evidence that the excessive interest was paid 
voluntarily.78  In order to do this, the Supreme Court of Japan held that it 
was insufficient that the loan company did not violate laws that regulate 
collection methods with administrative or criminal penalties.79  The courts 
must examine the totality of circumstances to ensure that the borrower paid 
the excessive interest of his or her own free will. 80  This holding placed the 
burden of proof on the loan company to prove that the borrower paid the 
excessive interest out of his or her own free will, and it was not sufficient to 
prove that the loan company obeyed all laws.  This burden of proof is 
onerous for the loan company to carry.  This will practically preclude all 
consumer loan companies from the benefit of Article 43, because it is 
practically impossible for the loan companies to prove by clear evidence that 
the borrowers “voluntarily” paid back higher interest.  
 
E. Viewing Overpayment as Satisfying Other Loans 
According to the Supreme Court of Japan, when the customer makes a 
payment towards excessive interest, that payment will be automatically 
applied to satisfy the principal.  All the payments made after the principal is 
wiped out are overpayments.  As we will see below, however, the Supreme 
Court of Japan came to view the overpayment as satisfying the principal of 
remaining loans and the principal of new loans taken out after the payment.  
Many consumer loan companies conclude basic contracts with 
customers.  Borrowers are able to borrow a series of loans under this basic 
contract up to the limit so long as that basic contract remains valid. 
Sometimes, when payments wipe out the principal of the original loan, the 
customer may have another loan under the same basic contract.  Then it 
would be beneficial for the customer to argue that overpayment should be 
viewed as satisfying the other remaining loans based on the same basic 
contract.  Sometimes, when the consumer pays back the original principal, 
there is no remaining loan but he or she might borrow money after the 
payment under the same basic contract.  Then, it would be beneficial for the 
                                                                                                                                                              
petty bench); Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 24, 2006, 219 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI 
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 243 (3rd petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 17, 2006, 219 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 927 (2nd petty bench). 
78  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 19, 2006, 219 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI 
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 31 (1st petty bench). 
79  Id. 
80  Id. 
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customer to claim that the overpayment should be applied to satisfy the 
principal of the new loan made after the payment.  Sometimes, the consumer 
loan company repeatedly lends money without a basic contract to the 
consumer, and the consumer might have other loans when their payments 
satisfy the original loan or may take out a new loan after paying back the 
first loan.  The consumer might want the loan company to apply the 
overpayments towards the satisfaction of the new or remaining loans.  
 When there is a basic contract to allow borrowers to repeatedly 
borrow and pay back money, the Supreme Court of Japan held in 2003 that 
borrowers generally prefer the reduction of the total amount of loan and do 
not prefer the existence of multiple loans.81  When the payment of excessive 
interest satisfies the principal and when there is an overpayment, the court 
concluded that payment must be presumed as satisfying the remaining 
outstanding loans based on the same basic contract, unless there is a special 
circumstance to indicate otherwise. 82   In other words, this holding 
established a very strong presumption that the borrowers’ intent was to apply 
the overpayment to the remaining loan in the absence of a contrary 
agreement in the contract.83 
 What would happen if there was no other outstanding loan when the 
overpayment was made?  There would be no other loan to be satisfied by the 
overpayment.  However, the Supreme Court of Japan held in 2007 that the 
basic contract should be interpreted to allow the overpayment to be applied 
to the satisfaction of the other loan even if that loan is made after the 
overpayment.84  This holding affirmed that the overpayment to the first loan 
under the basic loan contract should be viewed as satisfying the principal of 
the other remaining loans in the absence of contrary agreement.85  If there is 
no remaining loan, the overpayment to the first loan would not be 
automatically applied to the new loan made after the payment.86  But if there 
is an agreement to apply that overpayment to the new loan, then the 
overpayment must be viewed as satisfying the new loan.87  In this case, the 
basic contract allowed the borrower to borrow money up to the prescribed 
                                                      
81  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 18, 2003, 57 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
895 (2nd petty bench). 
82  Id. 
83  Id.  See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 11, 2003, 210 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ 
MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 617 (1st petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 16, 2003, 210 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 729 (3rd petty bench). 
84  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 7, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1537 (1st petty bench). 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
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limit and allowed the borrower to pay back monthly to the bank account of 
the loan company based upon the total balance of all remaining borrowings 
and interest rate calculated based on the balance.  The Supreme Court of 
Japan accepted this finding of the lower court and found that the 
overpayment was supposed to be applied to all remaining balances in total, 
and there was an agreement to apply the overpayment to the new loan after 
the payment was made.88 
 When there is no basic contract, however, the consumers have some 
difficulty, but there is hope.  In a 2007 judgment, the Supreme Court of 
Japan held that in the absence of a basic contract each loan contract should 
be viewed as a separate contract precluding the satisfaction of the second 
loan by the overpayment to the first loan, absent special circumstances.89  An 
exception can be made, however, when borrowings are repeated between the 
borrower and the loan company as if there was a basic contract, and either 
the second loan was already assumed at the time of the first loan or there 
was an agreement to view the overpayment to the first loan as satisfying the 
second loan.  This judgment did not allow the borrower to apply the 
overpayment of the first loan to a different loan in the absence of basic 
contract.  But if the borrower could prove that the second loan was a part of 
a single continuous loan or prove the existence of contrary agreement, then 
the borrower could apply the overpayment to the second loan. 
Indeed, in another 2007 judgment, the Supreme Court of Japan 
viewed the ongoing contractual relationship between the loan company and 
the customer as a continuous transaction when the second loan was made 
three months after the payment to the first loan, even in the absence of the 
basic contract.90  In this case, the loan company changed and added another 
loan every time the borrower increased its loan, and the second loan was 
made shortly after the first loan based on the same terms and conditions.  
The Supreme Court of Japan agreed that this was a part of a single 
consecutive transaction and the parties anticipated the subsequent loan at the 
time of the first loan and generally did not want the existence of multiple 
loans.91  Therefore, the Supreme Court of Japan concluded that there was an 
agreement to apply the overpayment of the first loan to satisfying the loan 
made after the payment.92  This holding made it possible for consumers to 
                                                      
88  Id. 
89  Saikō Saibansho[ Sup. Ct.] Feb. 13, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
182 (3rd petty bench).  
90  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 19, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
2175 (1st petty bench). 
91  Id. 
92  Id. 
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argue that, even in the absence of a basic contract, an overpayment of the 
first loan should be applied to the second loan even if the second loan was 
made after the overpayment to the first loan. 
What would happen if the basic contract expired and there was 
another basic contract and a new loan after the payment?  Could the 
consumer argue that the overpayment to the first loan should be applied to 
the new loan made under the new basic contract?  The Supreme Court of 
Japan held that in such a case, the overpayment to the first loan should not 
be applied to the new loan made under the new second contract in the 
absence of special circumstances such as the contrary agreement.93  Again, 
the customers had to prove that there was a contrary agreement to apply the 
overpayment of the first loan to the new, second loan, but at least this 
holding left room for the borrower to prove special circumstances existed. 
 Moreover, when the borrower borrows and returns money repeatedly 
under the basic contract and payment towards a higher interest rate on the 
first loan is to applied to another loan under the basic contract, the principal 
of the new loan is to be calculated by adding the remaining balance of the 
principal of the first loan after applying the payment of higher interest to the 
principal and the amount of new loan.94  The maximum interest rate should 
be calculated based on the amount of that new loan and, if the amount of the 
principal moves up to a higher amount, then the corresponding lower 
maximum interest rate would be applied and any higher interest rate would 
be void.95  When the amount of principal moves down to a lower amount 
                                                      
93  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 18, 2008, 62 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 28 
(2nd petty bench).  The Supreme Court of Japan listed the length of the first basic contract, the duration 
between the last payment under the first basic contract and a new loan under the second basic contract, the 
return of the contract document of the first basic contract, the validity of the ATM card to be used, the 
degree of contact between the loan company and the borrower after the last payment for the first basic 
contract and the conclusion of the second basic contract, the history leading to the conclusion of the second 
basic contract, and the difference in the terms and conditions of the loan between the first and second basic 
contract as factors to be considered to decide whether the first basic contract and the second basic contract 
should be viewed as a part of the single continuous transaction.  Id.  Therefore, the Supreme Court of Japan 
overturned the judgment of the lower court that held four basic contracts concluded between the loan 
company and borrower were parts of a single continuous loan contract because of the inclusion of the 
automatic extension clause in each contract and held that the court must also consider the length of period 
between the last payment of the previous loan and new loan.  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 14, 2011, 237 
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 263 (1st petty bench).  See also Saikō 
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 11, 2012, (3rd petty bench) (borrower concluded another contract with the loan 
company allowing mortgage on the property to pay off all remaining debts from the continuous loan under 
the previous basic contract, but the Supreme Court of Japan concluded that there was no continuity 
between the first basic contract and the second loan contract because of the differences in the nature of 
contracts). 
94  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 20, 2010, 64 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
921 (3rd petty bench). 
95  Id. 
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however, the same maximum interest rate rather than the higher maximum 
interest rate must be applied.96 
F. Allowing Customers to Demand a Refund 
As explained above, the 1968 judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Japan held that customers could demand a refund for overpayment to 
remedy unjust enrichment if the payment towards excessive interest was 
applied to satisfy the principal and there remained no principal to be paid.97  
This holding made it possible for many customers who had already paid off 
all the loans with higher interest rates to claim a refund. 
 The statute of limitations for an unjust enrichment claim is ten years.98  
As discussed below, the Supreme Court of Japan handed down a judgment 
in favor of the borrower as to the starting date of this statute of limitations.99  
Nevertheless, many borrowers who had made overpayments more than ten 
years earlier could not claim a refund because of the statute of limitations.  
Some borrowers, relying on tort claims, insisted that their claim for a 
damage award should still be permitted because the statute of limitations for 
tort claims is twenty years. 100   They argued that the loan companies 
committed a tort when they received payments towards the excessive 
interest, knowing that those rates were violating the Interest Rate Limitation 
Act.  The Supreme Court of Japan was not persuaded.101   
The loan companies were surely committing a tort when they 
employed violent or intimidating methods of collection, or when their 
behaviors were extremely improper in light of the social conscience, such as 
when a lender dared to collect money knowing that there was no factual or 
legal basis for their loans, or when the lender, as a regular loan company, 
should have known that there was no factual or legal basis for their loans.102  
But they did not commit a tort, the Supreme Court of Japan concluded, 
simply by receiving a voluntary payment for interest higher than the rate 
stipulated in the Interest Rate Limitation Act. 103   This holding, while 
rejecting tort liability of consumer loan companies in general, left room for 
claims that a consumer loan company had committed a tort when it received 
                                                      
96  Id. 
97  See supra note 32. 
98  MINPŌ [CIV.C.], art. 167, para. 1. 
99  See infra notes 118-21. 
100  MINPŌ [CIV.C.], art. 724.  The plaintiff must also file a tort action within three years of learning 
of the damage and offender.  Id. 
101  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 4, 2009, 63 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1445 (2nd petty bench). 
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
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payments toward excessive interest rates and the requirements of Article 43 
of the Loan Company Act were not satisfied. 
What would happen if the loan company sold its business to another 
loan company and there was an explicit clause denying the transfer of any 
legal obligation arising from the loan business to the new loan company?  
Could the customer still claim that their payment of excessive interest to the 
previous loan company should be applied to the new loan concluded with 
the new loan company, or claim a refund for overpayment from the new 
company?  The Supreme Court of Japan held that the scope of the transfer 
should be based upon the intent of the parties and, if there was such a clause 
in the contract, then the new loan company had no legal obligation to adopt 
the obligation of the previous loan company to refund overpayments.104  
However, this holding left room for the consumer to argue that, in some 
cases, the intent of the parties was to transfer to the new loan company the 
obligation to make a refund.105 
 
G. Imposing the Obligation to Pay a Refund with Statutory Interest Rate 
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Japan held that the consumer loan 
companies must return an overpayment at the statutory interest rate.  As we 
already saw, the consumer loan companies must return an overpayment to 
remedy unjust enrichment under Article 703 of the Civil Code.106  If the loan 
company is a bad-faith recipient (i.e. if they knew that they were receiving a 
payment without a legal reason), the company had to return the money at the 
statutory interest rate under article 704.107  Consumer loan companies argued 
that they were not bad-faith recipients because they believed in good-faith 
that the payment was valid under Article 43 of the Loan Company Act, 
                                                      
104  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 22, 2011, 236 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI 
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 225 (3rd petty bench).  See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 7, 2011, 237 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 139 (1st petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 
8, 2011, 237 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 159 (2nd petty bench); Saikō 
Saibansho [Sup.Ct.], June, 29, 2012, 241 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 1 
(2nd petty bench).  It must be noted, however, the transfer could not be made unless the debtor gave 
consent or the debtor was notified (if the debtor filed objection, the transfer could not be made).  MINPŌ 
[CIV. C], art. 466. 
105  For instance, if the contract between the parent company and its subsidiary indicated the intention 
of switching all the contract obligations between customers and its subsidiary with new contract between 
the same customers and parent company, then the parent company owes a legal obligation to make a refund. 
Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.], Sept. 30, 2011, 237 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 
655 (2nd petty bench).  See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 29, 2012, (2nd petty bench). 
106  MINPŌ [CIV. C.], art 703. 
107  Id. art. 704. 
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while consumers argued that the loan companies must be viewed as bad-
faith recipients because they knew that the higher interest rate was illegal. 
The Supreme Court of Japan held in a 2007 judgment 108  that a 
consumer loan company that receives a payment towards an interest rate 
higher than the maximum rate stipulated in the Interest Rate Limitation Act 
should be presumed to be a bad-faith recipient who is obliged to make a 
refund at the statutory interest rate.  Even though a loan company believed 
that it could enjoy the benefit of Article 43, that loan company is still 
presumed to be a bad-faith recipient, unless there are exceptionally 
compelling reasons for that loan company to have believed that it could 
enjoy the benefits of Article 43.109 
As a result of this holding, a loan company that fails to provide a 
written receipt as stipulated under Article 18 cannot claim not to be a bad-
faith recipient to avoid paying a refund with statutory interest. 110   The 
Supreme Court of Japan also held that if the loan company could not enjoy 
the benefit of Article 43, the loan company should have realized that the 
payments towards interest had to be applied to the principal and, if no 
principal was left, there was no legal reason to receive the payment and 
therefore the company should be viewed as a bad-faith recipient.111  All 
consumer loan companies that received payment after payment toward the 
higher interest rate wiped out the remaining principal are thus bad-faith 
recipients who are obliged to make refunds at the statutory interest rate. 
The Supreme Court of Japan affirmed this stance in 2011 with respect 
to a loan company that lent money under a revolving loan contract.  Until its 
holding in 2005, the Supreme Court of Japan had never made it clear that, 
with respect to such revolving loan contracts, the loan company at least had 
to describe equivalent information–such as the minimum payment 
requirements and the term and frequency of the payments–to satisfy the 
requirement of Article 17 to enjoy the benefits of Article 43.  The loan 
                                                      
108  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct] July 13, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1980 (2nd petty bench).  
109  Id.  
110  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 13, 2007, 225 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI 
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 103 (2nd petty bench). 
111  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 13, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1980 (2nd petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 17, 2007, 225 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ 
MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 201 (3rd petty bench).  However, before the 2006 judgment that precluded the 
application of Article 43 when there was an acceleration clause mandating consumers to return all the 
balance immediately when he or she defaulted, the consumer loan companies could not anticipate that 
judgment and therefore could not be presumed to be a bad-faith recipient simply because of the inclusion of 
such clause in the loan contract.  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 10, 2009, 63 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1170 (2nd petty bench).  See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 14, 2009, 231 
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 357 (3rd petty bench).  
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company in this case argued that, since the loan company could not expect 
this holding until that time, the loan company that failed to satisfy the 
requirement should not be viewed as a bad-faith recipient.  But the Supreme 
Court of Japan disagreed.112  It noted that it was easy for the loan company 
to expect that holding and that there was no clear legislative intent to allow 
exceptions for revolving loan contracts.113  The Supreme Court of Japan thus 
concluded that there was no exceptionally compelling circumstance to allow 
the loan company to believe that it could enjoy the benefits of Article 43.114 
As a result, consumer loan companies have to pay back refunds at the 
5% statutory interest rate.115  Moreover, the consumer loan companies must 
pay that statutory interest rate from the time the overpayment was 
received.116 
 
H. Delaying the Starting Date for the Statute of Limitations 
 
The Supreme Court of Japan held that the statute of limitations for a 
refund claim starts from the end of the basic contract, not from the date of 
overpayment.  As we already saw, the statute of limitations for an unjust 
enrichment claim is ten years,117 but there was a question as to when the 
statute of limitations starts to run.  Consumer loan companies argued that the 
statute of limitations should start from the time of overpayment, because the 
consumers could demand a refund from the time of overpayment.  But the 
Supreme Court of Japan disagreed. 118   So long as the basic contract 
remained valid, it held, parties generally do not anticipate that the borrower 
will demand a refund upon each overpayment; rather, the parties will assume 
that the overpayment should be applied to the new loans made under the 
                                                      
112  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 1, 2011, 238 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ 
MINJI] 189 (1st petty bench). 
113  Id. 
114  Id.  Applying this holding to a case before the court, the Supreme Court of Japan found the loan 
company provided the equivalent information even before its 2007 holding but found that the borrower 
already paid all the principal by paying excessive interest and therefore the loan company was still a bad-
faith recipient.  
115  There was a dispute over whether the rate applicable to refunds should be a 5% statutory interest 
rate, stipulated in the Civil Code (MINPŌ [CIV. C.] art. 404), or a 6% statutory interest rate, stipulated in 
the Commercial Code (SHŌHŌ [COMM. C.] art. 514).  However, the Supreme Court of Japan held that it 
should be a regular 5% statutory interest rate that should be applied.  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 13, 
2007, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 182 (3rd petty bench).  
116  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 17, 2009, 2048 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 9 (2nd petty bench); Saikō 
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 4, 2009, 231 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 477 
(2nd petty bench). 
117  MINPŌ [CIV.C.] art. 167. 
118  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 22, 2009, 63 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
247 (1st petty bench). 
JUNE 2013  CONSUMER LOANS IN JAPAN 581 
 
basic contract, and that the borrower will only claim a refund for 
overpayment at the end of the series of continuous loans under the basic 
contract. 119   It thus held that the statute of limitations should not start 
running until the time when parties no longer anticipate any new loan under 
the basic contract.120  The Supreme Court of Japan thus concluded that, in 
the absence of special circumstances such as the existence of a contrary 
agreement, the statute of limitations runs from the date of the end of the 
series of transactions under the basic contract.121  
As a result, even if more than ten years have passed since the time of 
overpayment, consumers are allowed to demand refund if the demand is 
made within ten years from the end of the basic contract.  This holding made 
it possible for an even greater number of customers to claim refunds.122 
 
I. Imposing the Duty to Disclose Transaction History to Customers 
Finally, the Supreme Court of Japan mandated that consumer loan 
companies disclose the history and details of a transaction to requesting 
customers. In its judgment in 2005,123 the Supreme Court of Japan held that 
loan companies had an obligation to provide the transaction record under the 
good-faith requirement arising from the loan contract.  Moreover, the loan 
company has a duty of disclosure so long as the company maintains the 
record, even if it is no longer mandated to keep it by statute.124  The failure 
to disclose the transaction record is a tort that entitles a customer to recover 
damages.125  As a result, the consumers could check the transaction record to 
find out whether they made overpayment, whether there remained other 
outstanding borrowing to be satisfied by the overpayment, and when the 
overpayment started.  This holding significantly facilitated consumers’ 
refund claims. 
                                                      
119  Id. 
120  Id. 
121  Id.  See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 3, 2009, 230 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI 
[SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 167 (3rd petty bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 6, 2009, 230 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 209 (2nd petty bench). 
122  Moreover, the Supreme Court of Japan held that the statutory interest starts to accrue from the date 
of overpayment even when there was an agreement to apply the overpayment to the satisfaction of new 
loan under the basic contract.  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 4, 2009, 231 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANSHŪ MINJI [SAIBANSHŪ MINJI] 477 (2nd petty bench).  Since under the holding of the Supreme 
Court of Japan a borrower is not supposed to claim refund under such an agreement until the end of the 
continuous transaction under the basic contract, there seems to exist some inconsistencies in this holding. 
123  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 19, 2005, 59 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1783 (3rd petty bench). 
124  Id. 
125  Id. 
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IV. IMPACT OF THE JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN 
What was the impact of these judgments of the Supreme Court of 
Japan?  In this Part, we will see that these judgments had a significant 
impact on consumers and consumer loan companies and that they prompted 
the legislature to introduce the 2006 amendments to consumer loan 
regulation and bring in much tighter regulation of the industry.  We will then 
examine whether this development was a blessing for Japanese consumers 
and consider whether this development successfully solved the root 
problems of borrowing money in Japan. 
 
A. Impact of the Judgments 
 
These holdings of the Supreme Court of Japan had a tremendous 
impact on the consumer finance industry.126  It is true that not all judgments 
of the Supreme Court of Japan are in favor of the borrowers.  Indeed, some 
dismissed the consumers’ claims against consumer loan companies.  
Consumer advocates and lawyers criticized these judgments as not 
sufficiently protective of borrowers.127   But at least as a result of these 
judgments, consumers were relieved of the obligation to pay higher interest 
rates and could even demand a refund from consumer loan companies if they 
paid unnecessary higher interest rates.  Many lawyers and law firms took 
this opportunity to make quick money and solicited consumers to consult 
with them in order to file lawsuits against consumer loan companies.128  The 
claims for refunds soared after these judgments.129 
 These judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan were strongly 
supported by lawyers and the mass media.130  Almost all lawyers and the 
                                                      
126  These judgments “had a disastrous impact upon the financial condition of loan companies that had 
previously relied on an expectation of enforceability of their premium rate loan contracts” under Article 43.  
See Johnson, supra note 77, at 29. 
127  YAGETA LAW FIRM, TOKUSHUNA KEISAN: KEIYAKUKIRIKAE, SAIKENJŌTO NO BAAI [SPECIAL 
CASES: EXCHANGE OF DEBT AND TRANSFER OF CONTRACT], available at http://www.yageta-
law.jp/site_debt/ksn/ksn06.html (criticizing the Supreme Court of Japan for its failure to admit the transfer 
of contract obligation to new companies). 
128  Post kabarai bubblewa nandemoari: Kenzaikasuru bengoshikaino yuuutsuna genjitu [Everything 
Is Acceptable in the Post Overpayment Bubble: Emerging Depressing Reality of Lawyers’ Society], 
DIAMOND ONLINE, (Mar. 13, 2012), http://diamond.jp/articles/-/16546 (noting that the lawyers are 
scrambling to find next lucrative job because the bubble of overpayment cases is almost over). 
129  Pardieck, supra note 14, at 569. 
130  Minashi bensaino tekiyounikansuru saikousaihanketsu nituiteno kaichouseimei [Statement of the 
President on the judgment of the Supreme Court of Japan concerning the Receipt of Higher Interest as 
Valid Payment] NIHON BENGOSHI RENGOUKAI [JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATION], 
Feb. 3, 2006, available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/activity/document/statement/year/2006/0602 
03_2.html.   
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mass media praised the bravery and wisdom of the Supreme Court of Japan 
in denying the receipt of higher interest rates and allowing refund claims 
from borrowers.  They called for much tougher regulation on consumer loan 
companies.131 
 Some estimate that roughly five million borrowers would be able to 
seek refunds and it is estimated that the total amount of refunds to be paid by 
all the consumer loan companies will reach up to ten trillion yen (100 billion 
USD).132  Consequently, many consumer loan companies, overwhelmed by 
this sudden rise of refund requests, went into serious financial trouble.  
Many consumer loan companies registered red ink after these holdings.133   
 
B. The 2006 Amendments 
The government responded to these holdings in 2006 by amending the 
Interest Rate Limitation Act, the Capital Subscription Act, and Loan 
Company Act.134  These amendments deleted Article 1, paragraph 2 of the 
Interest Rate Limitation Act that had precluded a borrower from claiming a 
refund if he or she voluntarily paid back the higher interest rate.135  The 
government removed the regulatory gap between the Interest Rate 
Limitation Act and the Capital Subscription Act and made the maximum 
interest rate of 20% the only maximum cap for loan companies.136  The 
                                                      
131 TOKYO BENGOSHIKAI [TOKYO BAR ASSOCIATION], SHUSSIHŌ NO JOUGENKINRINO 
HIKISAGETŌWOMOTOMERU IKENSHO [OPINION CALLING FOR REDUCTION OF MAXIMUM INTEREST RATE IN 
THE CAPITAL SUBSCRIPTION ACT] (Nov. 7, 2005), available at http://www.toben.or.jp/message/ikensyo 
/post-229.html. 
132  Press Release, Shihoshoshi houjin Shinjuku jimusho [Judicial Scribner Corporation, Shinjuku 
Branch], Yokohamachisai niyoru Takefuji motoshachoeno henkanhanketsuwo uke, sihoushoshi houjin 
shinjukujimushoga kabaraikin, shakkin mondaino muryousoudanmadoguchiwo Yokohamani kaisetsu 
[Judicial Scribner Corporation, Shinjuku Branch, Opened a Free Consultation Window on Overpayment 
and Debt Issues Based upon the Judgment of the Yokohama District Court Against Former President of 
Takefuji] (Aug. 6, 2012), available at http://www.atpress.ne.jp/view/29142. 
133  Johnson, supra note 77, at 30.  Some foreign consumer credit companies pulled out from Japan or 
significantly reduced their business in Japan.  Id. 
134  Kashikingyōno kiseitō nikansuru hōritsutō no ichibuwo kaiseisuru hōritsu [Act to Amend Parts of 
the Act Concerning Regulation of Loan Company and Others], Law No. 115 of 2006.  For a history leading 
to these amendments, see Pardieck, supra note 14, at 569-76.  For an outline of these amendments, see id. 
at 576-80. 
135  Risokuseigenhō [Interest Rate Limitation Act], Law No. 100 of 1954, art. 1. 
136  Shusshi no ukeire, azukarikin oyobi kinritō no torishimari nikansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning 
Regulation of Receipt of Subscription of Capital, Deposit and Interest Rate], art. 5, para. 2 (imposing a five 
year imprisonment and/or a fine of no more than ten million yen [100,000 USD] as a punishment).  
Everyone is prohibited from charging more than 109.5% interest rate by a five year imprisonment and/or a 
fine of no more than ten million yen, id. para. 1, and, if the loan companies concluded a contract with 
interest rate higher than 109.5%, then the punishment will be increased to ten years imprisonment and/or 
fine of no more than 30 million yen [300,000 USD], id. para. 3.  Depending upon the amount of the 
principal, there is still a narrow gap between the maximum interest rate stipulated in the Interest Rate 
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government prohibited loan companies from charging interest rates higher 
than the rates stipulated in the Interest Rate Limitation Act137 and deleted the 
old Article 43.138  The government authorized the establishment of specified 
credit information management organizations to share credit information 
among registered loan companies.139  The government also imposed a new 
obligation on loan companies to check the annual income of the customer140 
(using credit information obtained through specified credit information 
management organization), 141  prohibited loan companies from lending 
money beyond the borrower’s capability to pay back, and mandated that the 
total amount of a loan must not exceed one-third of the borrower’s annual 
income.142 
 It was remarkable that the legislature decided to delete Article 1, 
paragraph 2 of the Interest Rate Limitation Act and Article 43 of the Loan 
Company Act despite its past reluctance to deny loan companies the benefit 
of receiving voluntary payments of higher interest.  The government, long 
dominated by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”), used to 
be reluctant to deny consumer loan companies the benefit of receiving 
payments for higher interest rates so long as their business activities 
conformed to the government regulations.  Now, faced with the strong call 
for much tougher regulation from opposition parties such as the Democratic 
Party of Japan (“DPJ”),143 backed by wide mass media support, the LDP 
government decided to delete these provisions.  
These amendments took effect gradually.  But they made it more 
difficult for consumer loan companies to lend money and make a profit.144  
Indeed, Takefuji, one of the largest consumer loan companies in Japan, had 
to file a bankruptcy proceeding because of the enormous demands for 
refunds and the slim possibility of making enough profit to pay all of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Limitation Act and Capital Subscription Act.  But since the loan companies are prohibited from charging 
interest rate higher than the rate stipulated by the Interest Rate Limitation Act, any violation is null and 
void and may be subject to administrative penalty. 
137  Kashikingyōhō [Loan Company Act], Law No. 32 of 1983, art. 12-8, para. 1. 
138  Id. art. 43 (replacing old article 43 with a different provision). 
139  Id. arts. 41-13 to 41-38.  
140  Id. art. 13, para. 1. 
141  Id. art. 13, para. 2.  
142  Id. art. 13-2.  Also, the loan company was prohibited from receiving a life insurance payment from 
suicide when it is a recipient of an insurance payment arising from the insurance policy (id. art. 12-7). 
143  TOKYO METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY, DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN, SHUSSIHŌ OYOBI 
KASHIKINGYOKISEIHŌ NOKAISEI NIKANSURU IKENSHO [OPINION ON AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL 
SUBSCRIPTION ACT AND ACT CONCERNING REGULATION OF LOAN COMPANY] (Mar. 30, 2006), available at 
http://www.togikai-minsyuto.jp/html/teireikaihokoku/th18/1801ikensyo.htm#1801ik04.   
144  Finbarr Flynn & Takako Taniguchi, Moneylenders in Japan Brace for Losses, Shakeout on New 
Rules, BLOOMBERG, June 17, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-17/japan-
consumer-lenders-brace-for-losses-closures-as-new-rules-take-effect.html. 
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refunds after the amendments went into effect.145  Other major consumer 
loan companies had to be rescued by major financial institutions and became 
members of the major financial groups.146  The number of consumer loan 
companies that were allowed under these new regulations was significantly 
reduced.147  The judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan and the 2006 
amendments triggered a tremendous shrinking of the consumer loan industry 
and a massive reorganization. 
 
C. Blessing for Consumers? 
These holdings are surely a blessing for many consumers who had to 
pay back a higher interest rate.  They no longer have to pay the higher 
interest and they can even demand a refund at the statutory interest rate from 
the consumer loan companies.  Moreover, because of the 2006 amendments 
introduced by the Diet in response to judgments of the Supreme Court of 
Japan, many customers who are already deeply indebted will not be able to 
borrow any more money and there will be smaller number of over-indebted 
borrowers in Japan.148  
                                                      
145  Takefuji reported 433.6 billion yen [4.3 billion USD] in liabilities and would not be able to repay 
all the overpaid interest from borrowers estimated to exceed one trillion yen [10 billion USD].  See Takako 
Taniguchi & Takahiko Hyuga, Takefuji Files for Bankruptcy Protection after Refunds, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 
28, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-27/takefuji-said-to-file-for-bankruptcy-
today-amid-rising-interest-refunds.html.  Technically, it was a corporate reorganization application, but 
practically, it was an application for bankruptcy.  
146  Promise is now controlled by the Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc., led by the Mitsui 
Sumitomo Banking Corp., and Acom is now a unit of Mitsubishi-UFJ Financial Group Inc., led by the 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd.  These megabanks decided to enter into the consumer retail loan 
market by acquiring consumer loan companies.  Aiful remains an independent consumer loan company, but 
had to go through a reconstruction procedure with all lenders and seriously cut down its service in order to 
avoid bankruptcy.  Aiful, jigyosaisei ADR ga seiritsu [Aiful, Reconstruction ADR Accomplished], REUTERS, 
Dec. 24, 2009, available at http://jp.reuters.com/article/topNews/idJPJAPAN-13093520091224.  On the 
other hand, Lake was acquired by the Shinsei Financial and their business was transferred to the Shinsei 
Bank, Ltd., which could enter the retail consumer loan market without the statutory restrictions designed 
for consumer loan companies.  Shinseiginko, shouhishakin-yujigyouwo ginkouhontaide tenkai [Shinsei 
Bank, Offering Consumer Loan Service by the Bank Itself], REUTERS, July 20, 2011, available at 
http://jp.reuters.com/article/domesticEquities4/idJPnTK046574520110720. 
147  The number of registered loan companies significantly decreased to 2,677 in 2010, down from 
47,504 in 1986.  Atsushi Ohkawauchi, Kaiseikashikingyōhōno kanzensekō womeguru ronten [Issues 
Concerning Full Implementation of the Amended Loan Company Act], 699 CHOUSA TO JOUHOU 1, 8-9 
(2011).  In 2011, the number decreased further to 2,350.  NIHON KASHIKINGYŌ KYOUKAI [JAPAN FINANCIAL 
SERVICES ASSOCIATION], HEISEI 23 NENDO NENJI HOUKOKUSHO [ANNUAL REPORT, 2011], available at 
http://www.j-fsa.or.jp/doc/material/white_paper/h23/chapter3.pdf (hereinafter cited as Association Report). 
148  It was estimated that the number of over-indebted borrowers who were borrowing money without 
security from more than five loan companies decreased to 727,000 in 2009.  Ohkawauchi, supra note 147, 
at 5. 
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Does this mean that the Supreme Court of Japan finally won a battle 
against the Diet?  Was the legislature now convinced that the Supreme Court 
of Japan was right and that it was better to preclude consumer loan 
companies from collecting higher interest rate?  Or was the legislature 
reluctantly forced to concede that a more stringent approach must be adopted 
because of the devoted stance of the Supreme Court of Japan to protect weak 
consumers?  Or were the politicians of the ruling LDP, who used to be 
supported by significant contributions from the loan companies, deciding to 
revise the consumer loan regulation for the benefit of the consumers in an 
attempt to win the popular support and the coming election?  Or did the 
Financial Services Agency, formerly content with Article 43, grab this 
opportunity provided by the Supreme Court of Japan to accomplish their aim 
of reorganizing the consumer loan industry into the financial institutions 
they could more tightly regulate?  Is this merely an attempt by the Financial 
Services Agency to expand its power, possibly to elevate the agency into a 
governmental department?  Or is this an attempt by the Supreme Court of 
Japan to provide lucrative jobs for money-strapped lawyers?  Definitely, the 
judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan were tremendously good news for 
lawyers who are now forced to make less money because of the stiff 
competition caused by the sudden increase of the number of lawyers after 
the introduction of new law school system in 2004.  Was the legislative 
response merely a confirmation of this hidden motive of the Supreme Court 
of Japan?  
 Whatever reasons may exist for the government and legislature to 
accept those judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan, it is debatable 
whether, in the long run, these judgments and the 2006 amendments had a 
healthy impact on the consumer finance industry and consumers in general.  
It was not the regular consumer loan companies that created the more 
serious social issues.  Rather, it was black market loan-sharks that illegally 
charged extremely high interest rates and employed illegal and violent 
collection methods, forcing consumers into a desperate situation and 
creating more serious social problems.  These companies were not legally 
registered and usually did not have an established office.  Gang members or 
organized crime groups (yakuza) are often deeply involved in the operation 
of such black market operations.149  For those consumers who already had 
huge debt, they were the only organizations willing to lend money.  Despite 
the efforts of the Diet to introduce stringent regulation and the efforts of the 
                                                      
149  Pardieck, supra note 14, at 562; WEST, supra note 19, at 228-29. 
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police to crack down on them,150 there were demands for them and it was 
hard to wipe them out. 
 The registered, regular consumer loan companies were not, therefore, 
serious troublemakers.  However, by seriously restricting the regular 
consumer loan industry and reorganizing its members into major financial 
institutions, many consumers would probably face difficulty in finding a 
company willing to lend them money.151  The requirement to check the 
annual income of the borrower before lending money would definitely 
deprive many customers of the opportunity to borrow money.  The potential 
customers most affected might be housewives, who could no longer borrow 
money based upon the income of their husbands.  But many others, 
including small business operators who, for instance, need immediate money 
to pay salaries to their employees before receiving payment from clients or 
customers, would not be able to secure the loan. 152   It is questionable 
whether depriving customers of the opportunity to borrow money from these 
regular consumer loan companies was really necessary. 
 There is also a question as to whether it was a wise policy to set the 
maximum cap on interest rates at 20% per year and to deprive many 
customers of the opportunity to borrow and pay back money even with a 
higher interest rate.  Indeed, even before the 2006 amendments, most of the 
consumers who borrowed money with 29.2% maximum cap had no trouble 
returning the money back.  Now, as a result of the judgments of the Supreme 
                                                      
150  Of course, these loan sharks are violating the Capital Subscription Act and criminal penalties may 
be imposed.  The regulation against unregistered loan sharks intensified and the criminal penalty against 
violation increased significantly in 2003.  Kashikingyōno kiseitō nikansuru hōritsu oyobi shusshino ukeire, 
azukarikin oyobi kinritō no torishimari nikansuru hōritsu no ichibuwo kaiseisuru hōritsu [Act to Amend 
Parts of the Act Concerning Regulation of Loan Company and Act Concerning Regulation of Receipt of 
Subscription of Capital, Deposit and Interest Rate] (Unregistered Loan Sharks Eradication Act),  Law No. 
136 of 2003.  Their use of illegal collection methods can be also charged as a criminal code violation. 
Furthermore, loan contracts with extremely high interest rates may violate public order and good morality 
and would thus be wholly null and void.  See Kashikingyōhō [Loan Company Act], Law No. 32 of 1983, 
art. 42, para. 1 (any loan contract with interest rate higher than 109.5% per year is void).  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court of Japan held that a loan contract with such an extremely high interest rate is so unethical 
that the loan company could not seek a refund of the money it lent the consumer under a theory of unjust 
enrichment.  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 20, 2008, 62 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 1488.  When the customer sought damages against the loan company as a tort, the Supreme 
Court of Japan also held, the loan company could not offset that money and damages and subtract that 
money from the damages.  Id. 
151  The total amount of lending by loan companies decreased to 29.9357 trillion yen (299 billion 
USD) in 2010, compared to 54.5309 trillion yen (545 billion USD) in 1999, indicating a 45% decline in 
lending.  Ohkawauchi, supra note 147, at 9.  The ratio of conclusion of contract among the applicants at the 
four major loan companies in 2010 was 29.1% compared to 61% in 2005, indicating that fewer applicants 
are now approved for loans.  Id. at 9-10.  
152  It is estimated that among fourteen million customers as many as seven million customers would 
be refused loans.  Kaiseikashikingyōhōno hamon [Impact of Loan Company Act Amendment], REUTERS, 
June 18, 2010, available at http://jp.reuters.com/article/topNews/idJPJAPAN-15877020100618.  
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Court of Japan and the 2006 amendments, consumer loan companies cannot 
charge more than 20% and probably will not be willing to lend money unless 
they can make a profit with 20% maximum cap.  As a result, many 
customers will simply be shut out from the consumer loan companies.153  
Was this really necessary? 
 Moreover, capping the maximum, total amount of loans at one-third 
the annual income of the consumer also raises a more controversial question 
of whether such a limitation is necessary.  It is hard to find a country in the 
world having such an absolute total-amount limitation.  Apparently, this 
limitation is to protect the vulnerable consumers from borrowing money 
beyond their capacity to pay back.  But is there any special reason to believe 
that Japanese consumers need this kind of special protection compared with 
consumers in other countries?  Moreover, even if such total amount 
limitation is necessary, there still remains a question as to whether it is 
actually appropriate to set the maximum cap at one-thirds of the annual 
income.154  
In addition to these questions, there is a more serious question:  what 
would happen if those consumers who desperately need money cannot 
secure a loan from consumer loan companies?  Indeed, there is a significant 
possibility that some of the consumers who are refused a loan from regular 
consumer loan companies might be forced to turn to the black market loan-
sharks.155   Simply limiting the maximum interest rate and imposing the 
maximum cap on the total amount of loan does not help those consumers 
who need money but who would not be able to secure a loan.  Unless other 
kinds of help are available, perhaps some consumers might end up relying 
upon such illegal loan sharks.  Otherwise, they might end up committing 
suicide from desperation, not because of over-indebtedness but because of 
the failure to secure a loan. 
Thus, it is debatable whether the judgments of the Supreme Court of 
Japan and the subsequent 2006 amendments are an actual blessing for 
general consumers. 
 
                                                      
153  Masatoshi Kinoshita, Kashikingyōkiseihō kaisei wo meguru mondai [Issues regarding the 
Amendment to the Act Concerning the Regulation of Loan Company], 7 HIROSHIMA HOUKADAIGAKUIN 
RONSHŪ 1, 14 (2011). 
154  Id. at 17. 
155  Johnson, supra note 77, at 31.  Although the Financial Services Agency denies it, there are already 
some signs that indicate the sudden increase of customers who must turn to such illegal loan sharks.  
Saishin detaga shimesu kin-ychōno shissei [Most Recent Data Shows the Mistake of the Financial Services 
Agency], DIAMOND ONLINE, Oct. 31, 2011, available at http://diamond.jp/articles/print/14645; Loan-Shark 
Lending Surge Feared in Japan, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 8, 2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2012-08-07/loan-shark-lending-surge-feared-in-japan.html. 
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D. Roots of the Consumer Loan Issues 
The roots of the problem might lie in the Japanese people’s attitude 
toward borrowing money and in the legal system that is intended to save the 
deeply-indebted borrowers. 
Most people believe that when people borrow money they have to pay 
it back.  It is a contract and as far as borrowing money is concerned this 
belief is widely shared, even when the interest rate is quite high.  Borrowers 
know when an interest rate is quite high and agree to pay the money back 
together with that higher interest rate.  How can borrowers then argue that 
the interest rate was too high after borrowing the money?  This strong belief 
in the binding nature of the contract places tremendous pressure on the 
borrowers to pay back the money they borrowed, even if the interest rate is 
illegally high.156 
 Furthermore, borrowing money from a loan company is something 
most people do not want revealed.  It can be embarrassing, and therefore 
people want to hide the fact that they are borrowing.  Most customers of loan 
companies do not want their neighbors, co-workers, and sometimes even 
other family members know about their borrowing.  This sense of 
embarrassment has not changed even after consumer loans became 
commonplace.  The fact that the loan company workers come to the house or 
workplace to collect the debt alone would be extremely embarrassing or 
terrifying to the borrowers, something most borrowers would want 
desperately to avoid.157  This would make it hard for borrowers to seek help. 
 If a debtor is over-indebted and cannot pay back a debt, that debtor 
can definitely file a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding.158  Then, the judge 
might relieve the debtor of the entire legal obligation to pay back the debt 
and the borrower could start a new life.  Of course, filing a bankruptcy 
proceeding means that one’s future financial credit will be seriously 
restricted.  But if such a bankruptcy proceeding is quite easy, then the loan 
company would not lend money beyond the capacity of the borrower to pay 
back.  The borrower will be granted a second chance.  Nevertheless, in Japan 
the bankruptcy proceedings takes time and a filing of bankruptcy often 
means that the person is not capable of managing his or her own financial 
                                                      
156 It is often said that the Japanese attitude toward contract is more flexible. There are debates as to 
whether this description is correct.  See Michael Young, Masanobu Kato, & Akira Fujimoto, Japanese 
Attitudes Towards Contracts: An Empirical Wrinkle in the Debate, GWU LAW SCHOOL, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=363400.  It appears that the general public view 
contract strictly binding when it comes to regular loan contract. 
157  WEST, supra note 19, at 252 (noting that for Japanese people, publicly revealing the fact of debt is 
itself shameful and to be avoided). 
158  Hasanhō [Bankruptcy Act], Law No. 75 of 2004. 
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matters–it is embarrassing not only to the person who filed a bankruptcy, but 
also to other family members or even relatives.159  Filing bankruptcy is 
therefore something that one wants to avoid at all costs.160 
 In other countries, a debtor can run away and there is a chance that 
moneylenders will not find him or her.  But in Japan, there is a family 
registration system161 and a resident registration system,162 and every change 
of address must be registered.  Without the registration, it is extremely 
difficult to live an ordinary life in Japan.  These registrations used to be open 
to the public for inspection.  Despite the recent efforts to restrict access to 
these registrations,163 there is a high risk that creditors may find the new 
residence through this registration system.164  Running away is quite difficult. 
 Some of the loan companies require joint surety in order to borrow 
money, although major loan companies do not.  If the borrower cannot pay 
back the loan or run away, the loan companies can go after the joint surety, 
thus destroying the life of the person who became a joint surety.165  In most 
cases, the join surety is a friend, relative, co-worker, or boss.  The borrower 
does not want to ruin the lives of these people who were kind enough to 
become the joint surety.  These are reasons why some over-indebted 
borrowers ended up committing suicide in order to pay back their debts, 
                                                      
159  WEST, supra note 19, at 248-49 (noting that the feeling of guilt for burdening or offending the 
parents or family by filing for bankruptcy because of huge debt may be one reason a debtor chooses suicide 
over filing for bankruptcy). 
160  Id. at 230-32.  The number of voluntary bankruptcies gradually increased and reached 242,377 
cases in 2002, the largest number yet.  FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, available at 
http://www.fsa.go.jp/ordinary/karisugi/index.html.  The number of voluntary bankruptcy application 
gradually declined thereafter.  There were 100,509 voluntary bankruptcy applications in 2011.  Trends in 
the Number of Bankruptcy Filing by Self-aggregation Supreme Court, JAPAN FINANCE NEWS, 
http://www.financenews.co.jp/b/main.html.  After the Diet enacted the Civil Rehabilitation Act in 1999 and 
made it available for individual debtors, an increasing number of debtors came to use this civil 
rehabilitation proceeding rather than the bankruptcy proceeding.  See Minjisaiseihō [Civil Rehabilitation 
Act], Law No. 225 of 1999; See also WEST, supra note 19, at 256-62 (noting that the civil rehabilitation 
procedure could be more effective and less stigmatic).  
161 Kosekihō [National Registration Act], Law No. 224 of 1947. 
162 Juhmintourokuhō [Resident Registration Act], Law No. 81 of 1967. 
163 Id. art. 11-2, para. 1. 
164 JUHMINHYŌ NO UTSUSHINO KOUHUSEIDOTŌNO ARIKATA NIKANSURU KENTŌKAI [STUDY GROUP ON 
THE SYSTEM TO ALLOW REQUEST A COPY OF THE RESIDENT REGISTRATION], SOUMUSHO [MINISTRY OF 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND COMMUNICATION], HOUKOKUSHO [FINAL REPORT] (Feb. 2007), available at 
www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/jichi_gyousei/c-gyousei/pdf/jyuminhyo_utusi_16.pdf (noting that the 
creditor has a legitimate reason to see the resident registration of the borrower in order to find the place of 
residence). 
165   NIHONBENGOSHIRENGOUKAI [JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATION], HOSHŌSEIDONO 
KONPONTEKIKAISEIWO MOTOMERU IKENSHO [OPINION CALLING FOR A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE TO THE 
SURETY SYSTEM], available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/activity/document/opinion/year/2012/120120. 
html (notes that the surety system is one of the main reasons individuals are incurring huge debt and 
committing suicide, and calls for a ban on individual to become surety). 
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hoping that the life insurance payments would be sufficient to cover all the 
debts.166  
 Consumer advocates, lawyers, and mass media blamed consumer loan 
companies for all of the tragic suicides.  Because the consumer loan 
companies are willing to lend money and charge high interest rates, many 
borrowers ended up borrowing money beyond their capacity to repay and 
were forced to commit suicide.167  There is a need, some argued, to lower the 
maximum interest rate, limit the total amount of the loan, and force 
consumer loan companies to follow these regulations.168 
This is exactly what was accomplished by the Supreme Court of Japan 
and by the Diet.  Surely, the judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan force 
the consumer loan companies to obey the maximum interest rate.  Surely 
lowering the maximum interest rate by the 2006 amendment will reduce the 
burden of borrowers and imposing the total amount limitation will reduce 
the number of over-indebted borrowers.  It is noteworthy that the Supreme 
Court of Japan practically triggered all these changes by taking a leading 
role.  But it is unclear whether these changes are sufficient to solve the root 
problem of money borrowing in Japan.169 
                                                      
166  In 2010, 31,690 people committed suicide and 7,438 people were believed to have committed 
suicide for economic and personal reason.  See KEISATSUCHŌ [NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY], HEISEI 22 
NENCHŪ NIOKERU JISATSUNO GAIYŌ SHIRYŌ [DATA CONCERNING THE SUICIDE IN 2010], 
http://www.npa.go.jp/safetylife/seianki/H22jisatsunogaiyou.pdf.  Many tend to believe that the difficulty 
and stigma of bankruptcy proceeding is the main reason for debtors to choose suicide.  But see WEST, 
supra note 19, at 236-54 (questioning the correlation between bankruptcy and suicide).  The Japanese 
Commercial Code (SHŌHŌ [COMM. C.], art. 680) provides that the insurers need not pay insurance in 
suicide cases but Japanese life insurance contract normally excludes insurance payment for suicide only for 
one year after the contract.  Therefore, those debtors who committed suicide after one year can expect that 
the insurance companies will pay the life insurance so that the surviving family does not have to worry 
about the debts.  Id. at 260-61.  In some cases, the loan companies carried the life insurance on the 
borrower and received the payment directly from the insurance company, even without telling the 
borrowers or their families.  The Diet thus prohibited the loan company from receiving the insurance 
payment from suicide if it carried the life insurance on the borrower.  See supra note 142.   
167  NIHONBENGOSHIRENGOUKAI [JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATION], SHUSSIHŌNO 
JOUGENKIRINO HIKISAGETŌWO MOTOMERU IKENSHO [OPINION CALLING FOR REDUCTION OF THE MAXIMUM 
INTEREST RATE IN THE CAPITAL SUBSCRIPTION ACT] (July 18, 2003), available at  
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/opinion/report/data/2003_32.pdf.  
168  Id. 
169  After the amendments fully took effect the government, led by the DPJ since 2009, established a 
project team to report on the full implementation of the amendments.  The report made ten proposals in 
response to the criticisms, including a proposal to facilitate financial institutions to enter into consumer 
retail loan business, to provide safety net for consumers who need money, to provide loan for small 
business operators, and to call for much tougher enforcement of law against illegal loan sharks.  FINANCIAL 
SERVICES AGENCY, KASHIKINGYŌSEIDO NIKANSURU PUROJEKUTOCHIMU HOUKOKU [REPORT OF THE 
PROJECT TEAM ON LOAN COMPANIES] (Apr. 2, 2010), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/policy/kashikin/pt. 
pdf.  On the other hand, the LDP, an opposition after 2009, proposed amendments to the amended Loan 
Company Act to change maximum interest rate to fluctuate with the prevailing interest rate with the 
maximum cap of 30% per year and eliminate the limit on lending beyond one-thirds of the annual income.  
Jiminshouiga kashikingyohonado kaiseian [LDP Subcommittee Proposed Amendments to the Loan 
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V. THE PASSIVE COURT AND LIMITS OF JUDICIAL CREATIVITY 
 
A. Interpretive Method Used by the Supreme Court of Japan 
 
In addition to their huge impact, the judgments of the Supreme Court 
of Japan in the consumer loan cases are also extremely noteworthy for their 
judicial creativity.  They created a highly pro-consumer jurisprudence by 
ignoring the contrary legislative intent and rewriting the statute.  This 
creativity is all the more striking because the Supreme Court of Japan 
generally takes a very passive and conservative attitude toward 
constitutional adjudication. 
It is true that there was an inconsistency or gap between the Interest 
Rate Limitation Act and the Capital Subscription Act.  It could be argued 
that this inconsistency or gap was a result of the legislative compromise.  
While limiting the interest rate one can use, the legislature might have 
believed that the consumer loan companies should be entitled to receive the 
voluntary payment of higher interest unless the interest rate exceeded the 
limit criminally prohibited.  Apparently, however, the Supreme Court of 
Japan did not accept this compromise and employed a skewed interpretation, 
practically nullifying this compromise. 
 The Supreme Court of Japan must have faced a difficult dilemma 
when the legislature enacted the Loan Company Act and reintroduced the 
compromise.  In exchange for the introduction of government regulation, the 
legislature decided to allow the consumer loan companies to receive the 
interest rate higher than the maximum interest rate stipulated in the Interest 
Rate Limitation Act as a valid payment subject to the limitation set by the 
Capital Subscription Act.  Apparently, the legislative intent was to overrule 
the judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan.  But once again, the Supreme 
Court of Japan practically overturned this legislative judgment and wiped 
out the compromise provision in favor of the consumers.170  
 The interpretive techniques used are sometimes highly textual:  the 
Supreme Court of Japan demanded that the requirements of Article 43 be 
strictly observed before the consumer loan company could enjoy the benefits 
of Article 43.  As a result, the Supreme Court of Japan construed the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Company Act], REUTERS, May 23, 2012, available at http://jp.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idJPTYE8 
4M05Y20120523.  It appears that the LDP now regrets its 2006 amendment to the Loan Company Act.  
Since the LDP recaptured the government in December 2012, it will be interesting to see whether the new 
LDP government is willing to revise the Loan Company Act again. 
170  Pardieck, supra note 14, at 531 (these judgments “turned statutory law into dead law”); Kinoshita, 
supra note 153, at 8. 
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requirements of Article 17 and Article 18 utterly literally.  Sometimes, 
however, purposive interpretation achieves the goal of protecting 
consumers–the Supreme Court of Japan applied the thrust of Article 43 to 
revolving loan contracts, requiring the description of the equivalent 
information in the contract document, as required by Article 17.  The court 
also apparently wished to protect consumers when it denied the consumer 
loan company the benefit of Article 43 when there was an acceleration 
clause in a contract.  The Supreme Court of Japan did not care much about 
the compromise the legislature made in designing the consumer protection 
measures. 
 The Supreme Court of Japan sometimes presumed the intent of the 
parties was to afford protection to borrowers.  When there was a basic 
contract to allow repeated borrowing, the Supreme Court of Japan presumed 
that the parties intended to apply the overpayment for the first loan to the 
principal of the remaining second loan.  Even when there was no outstanding 
loan at the time of the payment, still the Supreme Court of Japan assumed 
that there was an agreement to apply the overpayment to the principal of the 
future new loan.  Sometimes, the Supreme Court of Japan allowed borrowers 
to prove special circumstances or contrary agreements while denying the 
remedy they requested in principle–borrowers could prove that the 
overpayment for the first loan should be applied to the second loan, even in 
the absence of the basic agreement.  But other times it completely ignored 
the intent of the parties, as when the payment of an excessive higher interest 
rate was applied to the principal of the loan even when the borrower 
specified the payment was the payment of interest.  
 It is remarkable that, in those judgments, the Supreme Court of Japan 
relied heavily upon the overarching purpose of protecting the interests of 
borrowers of the Loan Company Act rather than invoking the general 
clauses of the Civil Code.  Apparently, it felt that these general clauses are 
not appropriate, that they ignored the legislative provision.  Instead, the 
Supreme Court of Japan believed that Article 43 is an exception in light of 
that overarching legislative goal and should be narrowly construed, to be 
eliminated if possible.  This understanding led the Supreme Court of Japan 
to practically wipe out Article 43. 
 These judgments clearly show that the Supreme Court of Japan could, 
and indeed in some cases does, act quite creatively.  Moreover, the 
judgments are highly liberal in the sense that they are meant to protect 
vulnerable consumers against powerful consumer loan companies.  Despite 
its general passive and conservative stance toward constitutional 
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adjudication, these judgments show that the Supreme Court of Japan could 
adopt a very creative and highly liberal stance in non-constitutional cases. 
 
B. What Has Made the Supreme Court of Japan Engage in Such Judicial 
Creativity? 
 
Why could the Supreme Court of Japan believe that it should actively 
create such a pro-consumer jurisprudence, even by ignoring or disregarding 
the legislative intent?  Surely, Justices of the Supreme Court of Japan knew 
horror stories of many consumers who were forced to run away, sell their 
organs to pay off their debt, or commit suicide.  They must have been 
convinced that they must do something.  Moreover, unlike lower court 
judges, who are appointed right after the professional training and remain on 
the bench until their retirement, not all of the Justices of the Supreme Court 
of Japan are career bureaucrats working inside the judiciary.  Although by 
custom, six out of fifteen Justices would be appointed from lower court 
judges and two would be appointed from prosecutors, four would be 
appointed from practicing attorneys, two would be appointed from 
government bureaucrats and one from academia.171  Therefore, the Supreme 
Court of Japan could act more flexibly.  Indeed, Justice Takii, who took a 
lead in the development of the pro-consumer jurisprudence, was a former 
attorney.  But apparently, these judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan 
are also supported by Justices appointed from lower court judges and 
prosecutors.  Moreover, in the consumer loan cases, it is the lower court 
judges that played a leading role in shaping the pro-consumer jurisprudence 
that ultimately led the Supreme Court of Japan to create its own pro-
consumer jurisprudence.172  Lower court judges are generally more creative 
and more supportive to borrowers than the Supreme Court of Japan as a 
whole. 
From the standpoint of financial stability, the increase of unsecured 
consumer loans and the existence of a huge number of deeply indebted 
consumers is surely a headache.  But from the standpoint of consumer 
protection, the existence of illegal loan sharks and the use of violent and 
intimidating collection methods are more serious problems.  Instead of 
imposing much tougher criminal penalties or strengthening the regulation of 
or enforcement against these illegal loan sharks, however, the Supreme 
Court of Japan chose to deny the benefit of receiving higher interest rates 
from regular consumer loan companies and forced the Financial Services 
                                                      
171  MATSUI, supra note 4, at 123-24. 
172  Pardieck, supra note 14, at 554-56. 
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Agency and the Japanese Diet to adjust the maximum interest rate and limit 
lending beyond the capacity of the borrower to repay.  Why did the Supreme 
Court of Japan decide to take this course?  
Maybe the Supreme Court of Japan believed that it was unethical for 
consumer loan companies to take advantage of the loophole in the law to 
receive the higher interest.  It might have believed that the courts must do 
something to relieve the financial burden of those borrowers who had to pay 
higher interest rates.  Or it might have believed that the Supreme Court of 
Japan, as an ultimate guardian of justice and morality, must achieve justice 
even by ignoring the legislative compromise. 
 The judiciary does more than simply fill in legislative lacunae, 
Professor Andrew Pardieck remarked, and in the consumer loan cases we 
can find an example of judicial nullification.173  “The judiciary has rejected 
attempts by the bureaucracy and Diet to legislatively revise judicially 
established norms.  It has cast itself as an arbiter of societal norms and, 
through a technical application of the law, imposed substantive as opposed 
to procedural justice.” 174   Pardieck thus argues that the concept of 
substantive justice remains firmly embedded in Japan175 and that the courts 
viewed law “as a protective, regulative, paternalistic and now, above all, a 
paramount expression of the moral sense of the community.”176  In this sense, 
the Supreme Court of Japan might have attempted to achieve what it 
believes to be substantive justice by creating a judicial doctrine that is 
contrary to the legislative intent. 
 Moreover, the judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan taught a 
lesson to average Japanese consumers regarding the necessity and 
desirability of seeking legal advice from lawyers and encouraged them to 
file litigation, thus providing for the first time in history of Japan actual 
incentive to file a suit for many citizens.  As a result, claims for refunds and 
suits seeking refund as remedy for unjust enrichment soared.  In this sense, 
the Supreme Court of Japan might have attempted to show justice to the 
public as well. 
 The Supreme Court of Japan might have believed that it must curb the 
stronger power of the consumer loan companies to protect the vulnerable 
borrowers, reflecting a value judgment in favor of the community.  While 
adhering faithfully to the doctrinal constructs and language of the civil law 
tradition, Professor Haley pointed out: 
                                                      
173  Id. at 532. 
174  Id. 
175  Id. at 589. 
176  Id. at 586. 
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Japanese judges have fashioned the rules and adopted the 
doctrines in distinctive ways.  Instead of expanding the rights of 
wives, tenants, and workers for their protection, the courts have 
rather restrained the rights of fathers and husbands, landlords, 
and employers to prevent their exercise in ways that seem 
abusive or overreaching . . . .  In case after case throughout the 
century, Japanese judges have denied “rights” in order to 
ameliorate what they have perceived to be the injustice of 
property and contract enabling those with greater economic and 
social leverage to enlist the aid of the state against those with 
whom they dealt.  Rather than developing new rights for the 
weak, Japanese courts constrained the old rights of the 
strong.177   
Moreover, Professor Haley argues that these rules and doctrines are meant to 
reinforce the community and have a strong “communitarian orientation.”178  
He goes on to point out: 
Japanese scholars have introduced new theory and doctrines 
that in case after case enabled Japanese judges to shape the 
rules and principles of the codes to conform community.  
Japanese judges have discovered in their own community ways 
to ensure consistency in the law and, though self-policing, to 
maintain public trust and independence.179   
All these judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan may be explained as 
another example of restricting the stronger power to protect the weaker party, 
and they are also an attempt to enforce community values.  
  But in these cases, the Supreme Court of Japan practically reversed 
the judgment of the legislature and wiped out the compromise provision.  
However unpopular that provision might be, the question must be asked:  
was it appropriate for the courts to achieve justice, or even to reflect 
community values, by ignoring the legislative compromise?180 
                                                      
177  JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 204-05 (1998). 
178  Id. at 205, 211. 
179  Id. at 205. 
180  Professor Haley argues that the Justices of the Supreme Court of Japan shared the orientation of 
the community even in the constitutional adjudication:   
[I]n my view, judges in Japan share the prevailing communitarian orientation of their 
society . . . .  They also, I believe, accept the unstated premise that legislative and administrative 
decisions reflect a consensus among participants—not a simple majority . . . . As a consequence, 
judges are cautiously conservative.  They adhere to precedent and endeavor to maintain, as best 
they can in a changing society, legal order that is predictable and consistent. Stability is a virtue, 
not a vice.  They do not seek to be the catalysts of social change.  They believe in democratic 
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Of course, these judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan can be 
characterized as judicial attempts to engage in a dialogue with the legislature.  
The Supreme Court of Japan may simply be throwing the ball back to the 
legislature to solve the social injustice.  If the legislature was not happy with 
the judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan, it could overturn them and 
enact new statutes.  In this case, however, the legislature was ultimately 
convinced that the Supreme Court of Japan was right and revised the statutes.  
It might be argued, therefore, that there is nothing wrong with the judicial 
attempt to overrule the legislative judgment and call for further 
reconsideration.  The important question to ask in this characterization is:  to 
what extent should one allow the Supreme Court of Japan to overturn a 
legislative judgment.  In the consumer loan cases, the Supreme Court of 
Japan once stripped any meaning from Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Interest 
Rate Limitation Act and the legislature overturned the judgment and inserted 
Article 43 of the Loan Company Act.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of 
Japan once again overturned the legislative judgment.  The Supreme Court 
of Japan may be suggesting that it will not back off.  This is hardly an 
attempt at dialogue. 
 It still remains to be seen whether the attempt of the Supreme Court of 
Japan was a success.  But it is surely quite controversial whether the 
Supreme Court of Japan was justified in attempting to accomplish justice or 
to reflect community values even by ignoring the contrary legislative intent.  
When there is a social injustice, we cannot blame judges if they believed that 
they had to do something.  The public also expects the judges to do justice. 
But they must remember one thing:  judges simply cannot correct all social 
injustice.  Moreover, this may not be the proper job for judges and they may 




 Judicial creativity is not the hallmark of civil law judges.  But judges 
could and indeed do act quite creatively in some cases.  The judgments of 
the Supreme Court of Japan in the consumer loan cases showed that the 
Supreme Court of Japan is no exception.  Despite its passive and 
conservative attitude toward constitutional adjudication in general, the 
                                                                                                                                                              
institutions and thus defer to the democratic institutions of governance while maintaining, indeed 
reinforcing in their priority of values, the rule of law.   
Johan O. Haley, Constitutional Adjudication in Japan: Context, Structures and Values, 88 WASH U. L. 
REV. 1467, 1491 (2011).  Apparently, however, those judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan ignoring 
the contrary legislative intent are not as deferential to the democratic institutions. 
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Supreme Court of Japan indicated in these cases its willingness to overturn 
the legislative judgments and rewrite the statute.  If you are accustomed to 
cloudy weather almost every day, you will be delighted to see the occasional 
sunshine.  But it is at least debatable whether we could enjoy the sunshine 
brought in the consumer loan cases, because it is still unclear that the 
judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan were really a blessing for 
consumers and it is debatable whether the Supreme Court of Japan was 
justified in wiping out the statutory provision ignoring the contrary 
legislative intent.  It will also be interesting to see whether the Supreme 
Court of Japan is willing to show this kind of judicial creativity in other 
cases as well. 
